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The overarching goal of this portfolio is to analyze poorly performing states in an 
effort to determine if transnational terrorist organizations gravitate towards those nations 
whose limitations in state capacity would facilitate their ability to operate from within 
them. Drawing largely from the Fund For Peace’s Fragile State Index, case studies are 
performed to examine al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, al-Shabaab 
in Somalia, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in the Middle East region. In addition 
to Fund For Peace data and analysis, this portfolio draws upon research performed by 
various scholars and journalists, as well as discussions held at Congressional hearings. 
Research found within this work produces three main findings. First, it 
acknowledges that failed or failing states pose as attractive environments to transnational 
terrorist organizations. While poor state performance does not guarantee the presence of 
terrorist networks, it does enhance the probability of their existence, particularly if 
terrorist groups are already operating within other areas in the region. Second, research 
provided shows that allowing a state to completely fail is not a valid approach towards 
ensuring that terrorist groups are deterred from operating within a particular state. 
Finally, this portfolio provides the academic community a framework for the prediction 
of transnational terrorist movements by identifying poorly performing states and 
assessing their capacity to defend against a transnational terrorist group’s incursion, while 
taking that particular terrorist group’s ambitions into consideration. 
 
Advisors: Dorothea Wolfson, Sarah Clark, Benjamin Ginsberg 
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The United States has been at war with transnational terrorist organizations in the 
Middle East region for more than 13 years. For much of this time, the United States has 
been reacting to the actions and objectives of these organizations, and only after they 
establish themselves firmly within various nations in the region. It is my opinion that 
while the United States has performed superbly at finding and subsequently eliminating 
terrorists from their operational footholds, we fail to take a more proactive stance towards 
predicting where those footholds might be, and ensuring terrorist networks can’t establish 
themselves there to begin with. In other words, I beg the question, why fight a prolonged 
counter-insurgency if you can prevent the insurgency from occurring in the first place? 
Because the United States tends to turn a blind eye to the development of terrorist 
networks until they begin to affect our nation directly, we find often find ourselves 
providing a somewhat haphazard and militaristic response to the security challenges these 
organizations create after they grow into a substantial size and possess a substantial 
amount of power. I would argue that if the United States could closely monitor, and 
subsequently better predict where transnational terrorist organizations might be moving 
next, the U.S. could take alternative approaches to thwarting terror group objectives aside 
from placing American boots on the ground and performing massive amounts of costly 
air strikes.  
The main focus of this thesis revolves around taking a hard look at how 
transnational terrorist organizations choose territories to operate out of.  Heading into the 




the Taliban in Afghanistan were largely operating out of states that did not have the 
capacity to provide for their own internal stability. Furthermore, emerging organizations 
such as AQAP in Yemen and al-Shabaab in Somalia were gaining prominence in nations 
that were likewise, if not more unstable.  
The overarching purpose of this thesis portfolio is to answer the question as to 
whether or not we can draw a nexus between transnational terrorist organization 
movements and poorly performing states. After answering the question of whether or not 
a nexus between transnational terrorist organizations and poorly performing states exists, 
this portfolio seeks to identify the extent to which poorly performing states affect the 
manner in which terrorist organizations operate from within them. Finally, this portfolio 
seeks to determine whether or not it is possible for the international community to 
monitor state performance and use downward trends in state performance to serve as an 
indicator to government officials (and others) that transnational terrorist organizations 
might be seeking to gain footholds within them.  
The first chapter of this portfolio examines the rise of al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP) within Yemen. I examine Yemen’s performance as a nation, 
compared to other nations in the region, and find that she performs comparatively low. I 
also show how her poorly performing status limits her capacity to defend against outside 
threats, which in turn, provides an attractive environment for the establishment of al-
Qaeda cells to conduct operations out of. While analyzing the emergence of AQAP in 
Yemen, I note that the United States had very early indications that her security situation 




Despite these early indications, the United States did little other than provide financial aid 
that was subsequently squandered by a corrupt government until it was too late. As a 
result, the United States now finds itself in a long-standing air campaign against AQAP 
operatives within Yemen, and the situation does not look like it will be improving 
anytime soon.  
In the second chapter of this portfolio, I explore a train of thought discovered in 
chapter one. While conducting research in chapter one, I came across a few scholars who 
felt that letting a state completely fail was a valid alternative approach to deterring 
terrorist organizations because terrorist organizations require certain levels of operational 
infrastructure in order to carry out their desired operations. For example, a terrorist 
organization that sought to promote their cause via social media campaigns, would not 
want to operate out of an environment that was so deteriorated that the internet was not 
available. Following this train of thought, chapter two examines al-Shabaab in Somalia in 
order to determine to what extent a failed state hinders or helps a terrorist organizations 
operational capability. Somalia was used for this study because she is by almost every 
measure, the most failed state in the international community. I felt the answer to this 
question might be particularly useful for policy makers if we were to find that truly failed 
states are in fact less favorable to terrorist organizations than those which are poorly 
performing but still functional. 
The third chapter of this portfolio focuses on determining whether or not we can 
use the identification of states that are failing in order to predict the movements of 




and Syria (ISIS), which has grown to a substantial size and taken over large swathes of 
territory in little over a year. My intent is to analyze nations in the middle east region that 
are performing particularly poorly compared to others, and from there, determine if there 
are indications that ISIS is targeting those territories as potential areas to operate from in 
the near future. This section of my thesis identifies Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen as 
states that are of particular risk to a future insurgency by ISIS militants.  
The chapter continues further to identify potential partners in the region that the 
United States could utilize given their desire to possess a much lessened troop footprint 
within the Middle East, while still leading the charge against transnational terror 
organizations that pose stability threats to the region. The significance of this chapter is 
particularly relevant to policy makers because the ability to quickly and accurately 
identify nations which are at risk to a particular threat allows us to take a more proactive 
approach to supporting those nations as they brace for the challenges associated with 
deterring organizations with ill intent. 
I feel that this portfolio is relevant because it allows the international community 
a chance to place themselves a few paces ahead of transnational terrorist organizations. If 
we can identify a way to predict where terrorist organizations will be moving next, we 
can prepare for these movements. Proper preparation for these movements could come at 
much lesser cost, and could also serve to save a great number of lives. Instead of reacting 
to insurgencies, we can work with at-risk nations to determine what levels of assistance 
they need in order to prepare for the defense of their territories. Assistance could come in 




governance practices in hopes of winning over the regard of its citizens. Doing so, would 
assuredly incur a much lesser cost than putting troops on the ground and jets in the air in 
order to fight counterinsurgencies, which have proven to last decades under certain 
circumstances.  
In summary, we must continually seek ways to gain an advantage over the 
terrorist networks we face. One important step in doing so is to learn how we can better 
predict where those organizations are heading next, and take all measures available to us 
to prevent those organizations from gaining a foothold from within those territories of 
interest. If we continue to wait for the next big terror cell to rear its ugly head before we 


















Challenges in Defining Failed States 
 A long-standing struggle within the sector of the academic community which 
studies failed state theory is the lack of a consensus on a way to effectively define a failed 
state. As an example, Liana Wyler, in a 2008 CRS Report for Congress, notes that most 
governments “describe state weakness as the erosion of state capacity — a condition 
characterized by gradations of a regime’s ability to govern effectively, which, in its most 
extreme form, results in the complete collapse of state power and function.”1 
 A contrasting definition is presented by Robert Rotberg, in Failed States, 
Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators, where he seeks to identify failed 
states from an internal conflict perspective, defining failed states as those states which 
“are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested bitterly by warring factions” in 
which “much of the violence is directed against the existing government or regime, and 
the inflamed character of the political or geographical demands for shared power or 
autonomy that rationalize or justify that violence in the minds of the main insurgents.”2 
 The struggle to define what exactly “failed states” are stems from deeper level 
inconsistencies in terminology associated with the topic. As one researches failed state 
theory, they will notice that terms such as “failed,” “failing,” “weak,” “poorly 
                                               
1 Liana Wyler, CRS Report for Congress, “Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and U.S. 
Policy,” Congressional Research Service, updated August 28, 2008. Accessed 14 July, 2014. pp. 4.   
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34253.pdf 
2 Robert Rotberg, “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Cause and Indicators,” State Failure and 





performing,” “collapsed,” “underperforming,” and “fragile” are all used to generalize 
similar conditions of failure and are seemingly used interchangeably, with no clear 
delineation or understanding of what might differentiate a state from another in the 
context of each term. To complicate matters, scholars such as Rosa Brooks would argue 
that the term “failed state” is illegitimate on its own accord, as she claims that “most 
‘failed’ states were never ‘successful’ states” to begin with.3 
 Another challenge, noted by Stewart in the study of state failure, is that there 
exists a “cavalier tendency to apply this single label [“failed state”] to a heterogeneous 
group of countries; and inattention to the specific histories, trajectories, and regimes of 
the countries so designated.” 4 Because of this tendency to generalize many different 
nations under the “failed state” label, we find that it becomes difficult to effectively draw 
lines at which a state could be more definitively characterized as “poorly performing,” 
“failing,” or one that has by all measures effectively “failed.” 
Weinstein and Vaishnov, in A Mismatch with Consequences: U.S. Foreign Policy 
and the Security - Development Nexus, highlight how international security largely 
depends on a country’s ability to govern itself effectively: “They must be capable of 
patrolling their borders; monitoring the inflow and outflow of people, resources, and 
money; and preserving internal security.”5 The authors present that one of the greatest 
                                               
3 Rosa Brooks, “Failed States, or States as Failure?,” Vol. 72 of The University of Chicago Law Review, 
(Chicago: Chicago, 2005), pp. 1159-1196. 
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2117&context=facpub 
4 Stewart Patrick, “‘Failed’ States and Global Security: Empirical Questions and Policy Dilemmas,” Vol. 9 
of International Studies Review, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), pp. 646. 
5 Jeremy M. Weisnstein and Milan Vaishnav, “A Mismatch with Consequences: U.S. Foreign Policy and 
the Security-Development Nexus,” in Short of the Goal: U.S. Policy and Poorly Performing States, ed. 




challenges for policymakers is identifying those states which have the potential to greatly 
affect the stability of a region in an adverse manner, naming such states “pivotal” states. 
According to Weinstein and Vaishnov, “a pivotal state is defined as a hot spot that could 
not only determine the fate of its region, but also affect international stability.”6 By 
identifying pivotal states, Weinstein and Vaishnov hope that the international community 
may better focus attention and resources to the states that matter most.  
Weinstein and Vaishnov attempt to simplify the terminology regarding failed 
states by grouping “weak,” “fragile,” and “failing states” into an all-encompassing term 
of “poorly performing states.”7 They further note that “the range of terms used to 
describe poor performers illustrates the complexity and difficulty of precisely defining 
and assessing gradations of state weakness.”8 According to Weinstein and Vaishnov, 
poorly performing states are “states that exhibit a combustible mix of poverty and 
deficient government institutions that appreciably raises the risk of a collapse into 
conflict.”9  
As seen from the analysis provided above, the academic community is far from 
coming to a consensus on many definitional problems surrounding the identification, and 
subsequent labeling, of failed states. First, the academic community has yet to come to an 
agreement on whether or not a condition of state failure even exists in a world where a 
particular state’s performance is constantly evolving and is largely measured in a relative 
                                               
6 Jeremy M. Weisnstein and Milan Vaishnav, “A Mismatch with Consequences: U.S. Foreign Policy and 
the Security-Development Nexus,” in Short of the Goal: U.S. Policy and Poorly Performing States, ed. 
Nancy Birdsall et al. (Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development, 2006), 3. 
7 Ibid., 3. 
8 Ibid. 




manner to other states around the globe. Second, there are varying viewpoints on what 
characteristics or conditions a state must possess or meet in order to be considered a 
failed or failing state. And finally, there is no consensus on the terminology associated 
with certain thresholds of state performance, which complicates the academic 
communities ability to perform analysis in a manner where results are generally accepted 
and understood without being muddied by somewhat irrelevant questions regarding 
whether or not a state should be labeled as “poorly performing,” “weak,” or “failing.” 
 
Challenges in Measuring Failed States 
Before outlining various models and theories of what may or may not constitute a 
failed state status, it is appropriate to address the fact that there currently are no 
universally accepted criteria by which nations may unquestionably consider a state as 
having failed. Stewart Patrick, in Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and 
International Security, confirms this dilemma, stating that “there is little consensus about 
the number and identity of today’s weak, failing, and failed states, nor about the criteria 
that would warrant such designations.”10 Global Policy Forum agrees, claiming, “this 
definitional vacuum has inevitably led to polarized interpretations of this political 
condition.”11  
                                               
10 Stewart Patrick. Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 18. 
11 “International Law and the Problem of Failed States,” Global Policy Forum, last modified January 27, 






A second issue which must be addressed up front is that because there is no 
formalized definition or criteria through which to designate failed states, the numerous 
theories or models pertaining to them often use different terminology, which complicates 
the greater understanding of the problem being addressed. While one scholar may 
describe a nation as “failing,” a second scholar may describe that same nation as “weak” 
or “fragile.” Still others, such as Jeremy Weinstein and Milan Vaishnav attempt to 
simplify the confusion by categorizing weak, fragile, and failing states as “poorly 
performing states.”12 
 Weinstein and Vaishnov define and measure poorly performing states in 
accordance with performance based criteria provided by the Millenium Challenge 
Account (MCA), which was proposed by President George W. Bush in March of 2002.13 
The MCA identifies that Ruling Justly, Investing in People, Promoting Economic 
Freedom, and Controlling Corruption” are dimensions of performance by which nations 
can measured. The intent of the MCA was to “deliver substantial new flows of foreign 
assistance to low-income countries” that were performing well in the criteria listed above 
with a “commitment to providing assistance only to select countries whose governments 
already have established the policies and institutions most conducive to development.”14   
A second and more modern approach to measuring state “weakness” or “fragility” 
is proposed by Stewart Patrick, in what he presents as “The Index of State Weakness in 
                                               
12 Jeremy M. Weisnstein and Milan Vaishnav, “A Mismatch with Consequences: U.S. Foreign Policy and 
the Security-Development Nexus,” in Short of the Goal: U.S. Policy and Poorly Performing States, ed. 
Nancy Birdsall et al. (Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development, 2006), 3. 
13 Ibid., 5.  




the Developing World.”15 This index measures state performance based on “four critical 
sets of goods: physical security, legitimate political institutions, effective economic 
management, and basic social welfare.”16 Patrick believes that “a state is weak (or 
fragile) to the degree that it has deficits in one or all of these dimensions.” Patrick 
acknowledges limitations in his Index of State Weakness in the Developing World in that 
while it provides a “useful snapshot of state performance at a single moment in time,” it 
does not “capture critical dimensions of state fragility, including whether weakness is 
caused primarily by an inherent lack of capacity, or by inadequate will on the part of the 
ruling regime.” He continues further to note that his Index of State Weakness does not 
“specify the trajectory of the state.” The Index of State Weakness in the Developing 
World ultimately provides us with a tool in which users may place states into four main 
categories: “failed,” “critically weak,” “weak,” and “states to watch.”17 
In addition to providing his index, Stewart Patrick proposes that a state’s will and 
capacity to improve its condition plays an important role in defining state fragility. By 
measuring a state’s “willingness to pursue constructive policies and reforms intended to 
provide its citizens with fundamental goods,” Patrick suggests that states can be aligned 
into four categories: those with the will and the way, weak but willing states, states with 
the means but not the commitment, and those with neither the will nor the way.18 By 
comparing variations of will (strong / low) against variations of capacity (high / low), 
                                               
15 Stewart Patrick. Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 19. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 




Patrick is able to conclude that well performing states will generally possess both a strong 
will and high capacity to implement effective policies and reforms. Conversely, those 
states which possess low will and low capacity to progress will generally be poor 
performers as developing countries. 
Note that capacity and willingness are terms that can greatly change the 
perspective of one’s view when determining whether or not a state should be labeled as 
failed. One could argue that certain states have a willingness to perform better among 
these four categories, but simply lack a capacity, and therefore should not be considered 
as failed. Another might argue that other states, such as those which may be governed 
through a dictatorship, have the capacity to uphold acceptable standards across these four 
criteria, but simply do not have a willingness to do so, and thus should also not be 
considered as failed, as the current conditions within that country are a result of that 
nation’s cognizant choices.  
 Perhaps the most publicly accessible and more robust failed state index is the 
Failed State Index maintained by The Fund For Peace (FFP), an “independent, 
nonpartisan, non-profit research and educational organization that works to prevent 
violent conflict and promote sustainable security.”19 Working with over 50 nations and 
all sectors of industry (governments, international organizations, military, non-
governmental organizations, academics, journalists, civil society networks, and the 
private sector) The Fund For Peace utilizes a software based data analytics application 
                                               





which measures conflict risk in 12 indicators in order to provide an annual ranking of 
each nation relative to the international community.  
Those 12 indicators are grouped by FFP into three main categories: social, 
political and military, and economic. Social indicators would include mounting 
demographic pressures, massive movement of refugees or internally displaced persons, 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, and chronic / sustained human flight. Political and 
Military indicators would encompass the legitimacy of the state, progressive deterioration 
of public services, violations of human rights and rule of law, security apparatus, rise of 
factionalized elites, and intervention of external actors. Finally, economic indicators 
would include uneven economic development and poverty experienced by sharp 
economic decline.20 
 Given these three models, it becomes fairly obvious that there are a lot of 
variables involved in determining what may or may not constitute a failed state. 
However, establishing a consensus among scholars regarding the typical characteristics 
of a failed state is a bit easier to attain than it may initially appear.  
The characteristics of failed states that are most commonly measured by scholars 
fall into four main categories. Those areas revolve around a nation’s capacity or 
willingness to provide internal security for its population along with an effective form of 
border control, economic opportunity and prosperity, political stability found in a 
government free of corruption, and a system of providing for the social welfare of its 
                                               





people by meeting basic human needs.21  
For the purposes of this thesis portfolio, we will utilize a nation’s capacity to 
uphold acceptable standards across these four broad categories as a means of measuring 
the extent to which that nation has failed. Because a country’s will is much more difficult 
to determine and quantify, we will avoid using it as a formal basis for measurement 
throughout this paper. 
 
Do Weak States Attract Terrorist Groups? 
A final academic debate, which serves as a platform for the research performed in 
the following chapters, regards the question as to whether or not terrorist groups are 
inherently attracted to weak nation states, which would serve as ideal territories to 
infiltrate and operate from within. If one were to following their own logical 
assumptions, particularly when looking at where terrorist groups are conducting a 
majority of their operations today, it would be fairly easy to make the statement that 
weaker states are more susceptible to the incursion of a terrorist network due to numerous 
factors. For the sake of brevity, in this section I provide the points and counterpoints 
delivered by scholars James Piazza and Edward Newman, which highlight the arguments 
central to this debate. 
James Piazza, in “Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote 
Transnational Terrorism,” states: 
both failed and failing states, scholars argue, are theoretically more likely 
                                               
21 Stewart Patrick, “‘Failed’ States and Global Security: Empirical Questions and Policy Dilemmas,” Vol. 9 




to contain terrorist groups, experience terrorist attacks, have their citizens 
join and perpetrate terrorist acts, and see their territory used as bases from 
which to launch attacks abroad.22 
Piazza explains his observations of this common theoretical assumption further, stating 
three reasons why it is generally made. He notes first that scholars assume failed and 
failing states, “lack the ability to project power internally and have incompetent and 
corrupt law enforcement capacities.”23 Because of this, it is assumed that failed states 
pose as attractive areas of operation because terrorist groups can infiltrate and conduct 
operations within them largely unchecked by the host government, and should a 
functioning governing body exist, its political officials would be more likely to be 
swayed to turn a blind eye, or in more extreme cases, provide some level of state 
sponsorship.  
 Second, Pizza notes that scholars often assume that, “failed states offer terrorist 
groups a larger pool of potential recruits because they contain large numbers of insecure, 
disaffected, alienated, and disloyal citizens for whom political violence is an accepted 
avenue of behavior.”24 The assumption being made in this statement is that failed states 
create a base of unhappy citizens who would be inclined to willingly support terrorist 
group objectives as a means of expressing their discontent with the state of their current 
disposition.  
While this statement may likely be true to some degree, one must be careful to 
                                               
22 James Piazza, “Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism,” 






assume that because a citizen is unhappy, that they are likely to become disloyal to their 
nation. Furthermore, it is very much a stretch to assume that unhappy citizens are likely 
to take on acts of terrorism as an extreme means of expressing their discontent. I would 
argue, that citizens are just as likely to become inspired to attempt to improve the state of 
their living conditions through peaceful means.  
Finally, Piazza observes that conventional wisdom assumes that failed states 
possess “outward signs of sovereignty” which “places legal limits on intervention by 
other states” and provides its corrupt government officials a means to provide terrorists 
“with access to legal documentation, such as passports, visas, and end-user certificates to 
import and export arms, in exchange for money, political support, and physical 
protection.”25 The first portion of this statement is difficult to disagree with. It is 
unarguably harder for the international community to interrupt terrorist operations within 
a nation whose government has made it clear that they do not want outside intervention. 
However, as can be observed through cooperation efforts between the governments of the 
U.S. and Afghanistan, failing or failed states are not always averse to outside assistance, 
particularly when a failed state’s government knows this is their only true avenue towards 
providing stability and security to their nation. 
Edward Newman, in “Weak States, State Failure, and Terrorism” notes that while 
the drawing a correlation between transnational terrorist group movements and failed 
states “seems intuitively feasible, it is difficult to analyze the subject with a rigorous 
                                               
25 James Piazza, “Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism,” 




methodology and there is significant evidence to challenge the relationship.”26 He 
continues further to note reasons why this correlation cannot be conclusively drawn. 
First, Newman notes that “terrorist groups have emerged from, and operated 
within, countries which have strong, stable states and a variety of systems of 
government.” If one were to consider the recent uptick in what many consider “lone-
wolf” terror incidents within the United States alone, Newman’s statement holds true. 
While lone-wolfs are unarguably a far cry from being considered an organized terrorist 
group, it can be argued that they should be considered an extension of an organized 
terrorist groups global reach and influence, and that the actions of lone-wolfs can be 
claimed by certain terrorist networks. An example of this influence can be found in recent 
news regarding Major Nidal Hasan, notorious for acting alone in his 2009 mass shooting 
at Fort Hood, who has purportedly written a letter to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS) in hopes of joining their terror network.27 
A second argument Newman provides is that terrorism is “largely a ‘local’ 
phenomenon: directed at local structures of governance or authority, by local groups.”28 
The underlying point behind this statement is that an absence of some sort of functioning 
local governance would provide a subsequent absence of a government or authority for 
terrorist groups to challenge. In other words, in the absence of something to challenge, 
                                               
26 Edward Newman, “Weak States, State Failure, and Terrorism,” Vol. 19 of Terrorism and Political 
Violence, Issue 4 (Taylor and Francis, 2007). 
http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09546550701590636 
27 National Post. “Fort Hood Shooter Nidal Hasan writes letter to ISIS asking to join their terror group.” 
National Post. August 29, 2014. Accessed December 7, 2014.  
http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/08/29/fort-hood-shooter-nidal-hasan-writes-letter-to-isis-asking-to-join-
their-terror-group/ 
28 Edward Newman, “Weak States, State Failure, and Terrorism,” Vol. 19 of Terrorism and Political 




terrorist groups would have no purpose. Therefore, it could be argued that functioning 
states which govern in a certain way, possess differing religious beliefs, or who’s citizens 
act in a what terrorist groups may consider an unacceptable manner, are more attractive 
to terrorist groups than simply states that are merely unable to provide adequate internal 
security. 
 Finally, as already highlighted in prior sections, Newman notes that the debate 
regarding whether or not failed states attract terrorist groups is highly fluid because 
“disagreements exist about the definition of weak or failed states and how to measure or 
compare them.”29 Newman notes that because of these disagreements, it is difficult to 
“identify a pattern or correlation between a phenomenon which is analytically 
questionable (weak and failed states) and terrorism (itself a contested concept).”30 
 As shown by the arguments of Piazza and Newman, there are a myriad of 
unsettled questions regarding the nexus between transnational terrorist group movements 
and failed or failing states. However, what can be drawn from their observations is an 
acknowledged existence of an assumption within the academic community that weaker 
states are more susceptible to an incursion of terrorist groups than states which possess 
stronger governing structures. That said, one must also acknowledge that while terrorist 
groups tend to operate from weaker state environments, they do exist within and conduct 
operations out of some of the globe’s most stable nations. In other words, the relationship 
between acts of terrorism and failed states cannot be considered mutually inclusive. 
                                               
29 Edward Newman, “Weak States, State Failure, and Terrorism,” Vol. 19 of Terrorism and Political 





Yemen: A Failing State, Transnational Terrorism, and U.S. Policy 
 
Tackling the ever-evolving issue of transnational terrorism has been at the 
forefront of U.S. foreign policy objectives since Al Qaeda conducted a series of attacks 
which occurred in New York City and Washington DC on the 11th of September, 2001. 
In a speech given by President George Bush on 6 September 2006, he describes 
transnational terror organizations as groups which: 
represent no nation, defend no territory, and wear no uniform.  They do 
not mass armies on borders, or flotillas of warships on the high seas.  They 
operate in the shadows of society; they send small teams of operatives to 
infiltrate free nations; they live quietly among their victims; they conspire 
in secret, and then they strike without warning.31  
Characterized as such, terrorist organizations must constantly seek out and 
infiltrate new regions of the world, which may provide suitable conditions for them to 
operate effectively within. In doing so, terrorist organizations are likely to gravitate 
towards failed or failing states which do not have the means of preventing their presence, 
or may simply tolerate their actions within their borders.  
The intent of this paper is to meet the following objectives. First, to explain a 
growing connection between transnational terrorism and failed or failing states. Second, 
to highlight how Yemen can be defined as a failed or failing state within the definitional 
theories and measurement models provided in the first chapter of this portfolio. Third, to 
                                               





establish how Yemen poses as an attractive nation for terrorist organizations to operate 
from due to its fragile status. Fourth, to provide an account of recent U.S. policy 
responses to a growing presence of terrorist activity within Yemen. And finally, to 
provide ways in which the United States may improve its response to the issue of 
transnational terrorism while terrorist organizations seek to expand their operating base 
amongst nations that have failed or may be considered failing.  
 
Where does Yemen Stand? 
 According to The Fund For Peace’s Failed State Index for 2011, Yemen ranked as 
the 13th most at risk nation out of 177 nations assessed.32 Of the 12 indicators measured, 
Yemen’s worst performance scores were achieved in the political and military category, 
where they are highlighted by a lack of security apparatus and a rise of factionalized 
elites. Other questions are raised with regards to the legitimacy of the state, and a 
progressive deterioration of public services. This score reflects a year in which “Yemeni 
citizens began protesting against corruption and eventually for the ouster of President Ali 
Abdullah Saleh’s regime.”33  
 According to FFP’s country profile of Yemen, “the situation has further 
deteriorated with divisions among tribal leaders” increasing in response to the political 
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instability wrought throughout Yemen’s government.34 While an election in February 
2012 has brought President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi to power, it will be interesting to 
closely monitor Yemen’s developments towards improving what was largely deemed by 
its citizens as an illegitimate or corrupt form of government.  
 Stewart Patrick’s Index of State Weakness in the Developing World ranks Yemen 
as the 30th worst performing country out of a 141-country sample. Yemen’s overall score 
of 5.18 places them two places outside of the bottom quintile with their lowest 
performance ratings occurring in the Political (3.64) and Social Welfare (4.85) categories. 
To provide some context, Somalia ranked the lowest in this index with an overall score of 
.52 while the Slovak Republic ranked the highest overall with a score of 9.41 out of a 
best possible score of 10.00.35  
 When Jeremy Weinstein and Milan Vaishnav measured dimensions of poor 
performance based off of the MCA’s 2004 selection process, Yemen was measured as a 
“near miss” for failing to meet the performance requirement of ruling justly. A state is 
considered to be a “near-miss” if it fails to meet just one of the performance driven 
criteria within this model: ruling justly, investing in people, and promoting economic 
freedom. 36  
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 Perhaps the most alarming data regarding Yemen’s performance as a state arises 
from FFP historical reports that show Yemen as having experienced a downward trend in 
performance for the last five years consecutively. 37 Yemen ranked 15th in 2010, 18th in 
2009, 21st in 2008, and 24th in 2007.  Yemen’s lowest-ever ranking within the FFP’s 
failed state index was scored in 2005 with a ranking of 8th, which was also the first year 
FFP provided an index.  
 While it may be difficult to officially declare Yemen a failed state, it is certainly 
appropriate to suggest that Yemen is a poorly performing nation that is trending 
negatively and, as such, may be considered a failing state.  
 
Transnational Terrorism and Failing States 
There appears to be a conventional wisdom that establishes a nexus between 
transnational terrorism and failed or failing states. According to Michael T. Klare, author 
of The Deadly Connection: Paramilitary Bands, Small Arms Diffusion, and State Failure, 
“state failure usually results from the prolonged interaction of a number of powerful 
corrosive factors, including economic stagnation, political and ethnic factionalism, 
pervasive corruption, decaying national infrastructure, and environmental degradation.”38 
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When states experience some or all of these factors, they are likely to see a rise in 
“paramilitary bands” which goes hand in hand with a “decline of state authority.”39 
Klare believes that “a functioning state is expected to possess many attributes, but 
the most significant of these is its capacity to protect the national population from 
external attack and internal disorder.”40 Additionally, a state should be expected to be 
able to defend against external influences regardless of whether the threat is posed by a 
state or non-state actor. In respect to the factors of decay provided above, a state can 
experience these factors and still exercise authority over its population, however, this is 
only possible so long as its “legitimate use of violence goes unchallenged.”41 Klare 
continues this point further by explaining that “once sub-state organizations of a 
paramilitary nature - ethnic militias, separatist forces, guerrilla groups, warlord armies, 
and so on - begin to form, the central government must act swiftly to disarm and dissolve 
these entities or its control over the nation will rapidly evaporate.”42 
Because of these factors, it is attractive for terrorist organizations to attempt to 
gain footholds in nations that are experiencing the corrosive factors outlined by Klare. A 
nation that is experiencing problems across this front, may not have the capability or the 
willingness to address internal or external security risks presented by the emergence of 
terrorist organizations while, at the same time, addressing national performance issues 
that may be easier or more straight forward to tackle. 
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There are numerous modern day examples of nations that are unquestionably 
considered failed states and provide themselves as good cases by which to establish a 
nexus between poor performance and terrorism. Two of the more prominent examples 
can be found in Afghanistan and Somalia.  
Somalia is ranked number one on the FFP’s failed state index with a score of 
113.4 out of a possible 120 points, performing extremely poorly in each of its 12 
indicators.43 Additionally, Somalia ranks number one as the worst performer according to 
Patrick’s Index of State Weakness in the Developing World, with a score of .52 out of a 
best possible score of 10. Of Patrick’s four performance criteria, Somalia scored zero 
points in both the political and economic categories.44  
According to Brock F Tessman, author of A Quantitative Depiction of Somalia at 
the Crossroads: Assessing National Capability and Humanitarian Development, Somalia 
“functions as a battlefield for rival states such as Eritrea and Ethiopia, as well as non-state 
organizations such as the Union of Islamic Courts and other armed groups.”45 He 
maintains because “there is no central authority that can maintain border security and 
internal order in Somalia,”46 there exist conditions by which Somalia has been subject to 
mass arms trafficking and has allowed terrorist organizations such as al-Shabaab to 
establish ideological and training related ties with terrorist organizations, namely Al 
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Qaeda.47 Al-Shabaab’s actions in recent years have gained noteworthy praise by leading 
Al Qaeda officials. In a video released in February 2009, then second in command 
Ayman al-Zawahiri mentions al-Shabaab stating, “the group will engage in Jihad against 
the American-made government in the same way they engaged in Jihad against the 
Ethiopians and the warlords before them.”48  
There is debate as to whether Somalia may prove to be a safe haven for terrorists. 
Some scholars will argue that their lack of law and border enforcement make Somalia an 
attractive area to establish as a place to hide. Others argue that Somalia’s clan-based 
nature makes it very difficult for outside organizations to establish and maintain 
footholds within the country. Regardless of this argument, it is safe to say that extremist 
groups within Somalia have at a minimum, established and maintained an ideological tie 
to al-Qaeda.  
 Organizations such as al-Shabaab pose a clear domestic threat to the 
United States and the rest of the world. “Somali-Americans were arrested in Minnesota in 
early 2009 after returning from fighting alongside al-Shabaab, and in late August 2009, 
several Somalis were arrested in Melbourne for planning a major suicide attack on an 
Australian army installation.”49 The fact that organizations such as al-Shabaab are able to 
recruit American citizens for their cause is an issue that further complicates the United 
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States ability to prevent their existence domestically since American citizens can travel to 
and from the United States with relative ease, especially if those individuals are not 
already on any agencies radars. 
Afghanistan serves as a much more obvious example of a connection between 
failed states and terrorist activity. On the FFP’s failed state index, Afghanistan ranks #7 
with a total score of 107.5 out of a maximum 120 points, performing poorly in each of its 
12 indicators.50 On Patrick’s index, Afghanistan ranks number two with a score of 1.65 
out of a possible 10 points. Of Patrick’s four criteria, Afghanistan scored a zero out of 10 
points in both the security and social welfare performance categories.51 
Symptoms of terrorism in Afghanistan are largely believed to have been 
established by the Taliban. According to a background note provided by the Department 
of the State, the Taliban arose to power “in the mid-1990s in reaction to the anarchy and 
warlordism that arose after the withdrawal of Soviet forces.”52 The Taliban are known for 
providing a sanctuary for Osama bin Ladin beginning in the mid-1990’s and providing a 
base for Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations to establish themselves. In return, 
Osama bin Ladin was known to have provided financial and political support to the 
Taliban. Osama bin Ladin and Al Qaeda were most famously responsible for the attacks 
against the United States on September 11th, which sparked the United States’ Global 
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War on Terror, which has U.S. troops still fighting Al Qaeda operatives within 
Afghanistan to date. 53 
The National Counterterrorism Center provides a reporting tool called the 
Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS), which generates reports on terrorist 
activity within a user defined range of time. According to WITS, in 2011 alone, 
Afghanistan experienced 2872 terrorist related attacks while Somalia experienced 614. 
Whether or not these attacks are related to Al Qaeda is irrelevant, as terrorist activity is 
occurring within each of these countries on a regular basis.54 
The bottom line is that failed or failing states lack the structural and institutional 
infrastructure to address issues within their own borders. In addition to lacking the ability 
to look after the welfare of their own people, failed or failing states do not possess the 
capability of providing internal security, which creates an environment which is to 
conducive to harboring terrorist organizations. Whether failed states wish to have terrorist 
organizations operating within their borders or not, they do not possess the means to rid 
of those groups if they wanted to. Afghanistan and Somalia serve as prime examples of 
states which are experiencing high levels of terrorist activity due to the their failed status.  
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Al Qaeda and Yemen 
 Jeremy M. Sharp, author of Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations, suggests that 
Al Qaeda’s earliest roots in Yemen are found in a group called the Aden-Abyan Islamic 
Army, which was founded by an associate of Osama Bin Ladin and was directly 
supported by the Yemini government in the 1990s.55 According to Sharp, “this group, 
according to the 9/11 Commission Report, may also have been involved in a plot to kill 
U.S. marines temporarily transiting through Aden on their way to Somalia” which is 
considered to be “one of Al Qaeda’s earliest known endorsed attacks against U.S. 
personnel. 56 
   It wouldn’t be until Al Qaeda launched an attack against the USS Cole in 2000 
in the port of Aden, killing 17 U.S. service members, that Al Qaeda’s presence in Yemen 
would again be at the forefront of U.S. interests. It is highlighted by Sharp that “in the 
immediate aftermath of the Cole bombing, U.S. officials complained that Yemeni 
authorities were not cooperating in the investigation” that followed.57 However, it is 
believed that after the 9/11 attacks, Yemeni officials were much more willing to 
cooperate with the U.S. and their intent to suppress Al Qaeda in fear that the U.S. would 
be inclined to target Yemen in addition to Iraq and Afghanistan.58 
 Unfortunately, it is believed that President Saleh lessened pressure on Al Qaeda 
and its affiliates due to a constant juggling act with competing domestic and international 
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interests over time.59 At the same time, the war in Iraq is believed to have radicalized 
many Jihadists, of which some have relocated to Yemen in order to support Al Qaeda’s 
efforts there. Those militants are known to have created “an affiliate of Al Qaeda called, 
‘The Al Qaeda Organization in the Southern Arabian Peninsula,’ though most observers 
simply referred to it as Al Qaeda in Yemen.”60 In early 2009, Al Qaeda’s militants 
announced a merge between Saudi and Yemeni based groups, under the name of Al 
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which remains the name under which those 
terrorists are operating today. Al Qaeda’s efforts in Yemen are now aimed at disrupting 
the government of Yemen, due to its gradually increasing ties and cooperation with the 
United States government.  
 Other high profile terrorist incidents have been linked to Al Qaeda’s presence in 
Yemen. On Christmas day of 2009, the United States was reminded again of Yemen’s 
ties to Al Qaeda when a Nigerian man named Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to 
detonate an explosive device on Northwest Airlines flight 253 over Detroit, Michigan. 
During his interrogation, Umar Abdulmutallab stated that he received training from Al 
Qaeda operatives in Yemen, as well as the device he intended to use in blowing up the 
aircraft. 61 Additionally, Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, who was responsible for a shooting 
rampage at Ft. Hood which left 13 persons dead, was believed to have been in 
communication with Anwar al-Awlaki, a now deceased Al Qaeda operative out of 
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Yemen.62 Awlaki is also believed to have direct ties to Abdulmutallab’s failed Christmas 
Day operation.  
The AQAP is what Patrick considers to be a “top tier” Al Qaeda linked terrorist 
group, which means the AQAP “may receive financial support and training from Al 
Qaeda, conduct joint operations and planning sessions, and have extensive leadership 
ties.”63 This ties into a greater concern the United States has regarding Al Qaeda’s 
growing capabilities in recruiting and radicalizing American citizens, who are traveling to 
Yemen in hopes of establishing a more substantial affiliation with the organization while 
maintaining a U.S. citizenship that may be leveraged in Al Qaeda’s favor down the road.  
 What differentiates Yemen from Afghanistan and Somalia is that Yemen is a state 
that can still be considered failing and has not totally failed. With this in mind, Stewart 
Patrick suggests a unique idea in that “truly failed states are less attractive to terrorists 
than merely weak ones.”64 He continues this point further by explaining that: 
while anarchical zones can provide certain niche benefits, they do not 
offer the full spectrum of services available in weak states. Instead, failed 
states tend to suffer from a number of security, logistical, geographic, and 
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political drawbacks that make them inhospitable to transnational 
terrorists.65  
From a security standpoint, states that have totally failed do not provide terrorists 
the same security options available to terrorist organizations based in failing states. A 
terrorist group in a failed state may find that they are required to ensure their own 
security, while that same group in a failing state may be able to bribe or hire local forces 
to provide protection. Failing states are more likely to still have a functional logistical 
infrastructure, facilitating an ease in transportation, transfer of goods, etc. From a 
political standpoint, terrorist organizations may find that a state which possesses a 
government with some legitimate governing authority possesses an opportunity to be 
leveraged in the terrorist organizations favor. In an age where means of quick and 
effective communication are necessary for terrorist recruitment and operations, 
organizations such as Al Qaeda can not afford to operate in locations that do not provide 
the basics, such as the internet or a wireless telecommunication infrastructure. 
 In this regard, Yemen poses as an even more attractive base of operations for 
organizations such as Al Qaeda. Patrick’s conclusion is that “rather than truly failed 
states, what terrorists and other illicit transnational groups find most conducive are weak 
but functioning states, where formal state structures and trappings of sovereignty exist in 
a rudimentary form but are fragile and susceptible to corruption.”66 Under this pretext, it 
is safe to assume that a state such as Yemen is more likely to facilitate growth of a 
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terrorist organization, providing yet another reason as to why they should be given 
appropriate attention with regards to future terrorist movements.  
  On a different note, and perhaps a bit more counterintuitive, if Patrick’s theory 
holds true and failing states are in fact more beneficial to terrorist organizations than 
states that have totally failed, would it not be more beneficial to accept or perhaps even 
facilitate state failure to the point that Yemen is no longer beneficial to terrorist 
organizations? While this notion resonates with individuals who prefer a more isolationist 
approach to international relations and may lend itself effective in making a nation more 
difficult to conduct terrorist operations out of, it does not account for the fact that in 
addition to areas that terrorist organizations need to operate out of, terrorist organizations 
seek lawless areas to simply lay low in. Failed states provide just that.  
 It would be worth dedicating future research into testing this theory with a focus 
on determining if terrorist organizations are found in failed states as a result of a presence 
that was established when a state was failing, or if failed states alone pose an attractive 
enough environment for terrorist organizations to migrate to, despite more austere 
operating conditions. 
 
Yemen and U.S. Policy 
 David Carment, in Preventing State Failure, states that:  
policy makers, and the research community charged with keeping them 




preliminary events that culminate in situations of ethnic catastrophe and 
state failure.67  
The United States may have very well fallen victim to this problem with regards to their 
foreign policy endeavors with Yemen, in light of a continued downward trend in state 
performance, coupled with a growing presence of terrorist organizations and activity 
within its borders.  
 Historically, the United States has recognized Yemen’s weak status and a 
willingness to better themselves, and has generally geared towards a foreign policy that 
relies heavily on foreign aid to assist Yemen with a goal of providing better living 
conditions for its citizens. FY2011 USAID assistance to Yemen is estimated at $40 
million dollars with a majority of that aid focused on livelihoods and governance for 
vulnerable populations.68  Military support in the form of funding and direct security 
related measures has increased significantly in recent years, however, this is largely due 
to the Christmas Day bombing attempt that refocused American eyes on Yemen and its 
vulnerability to Al Qaeda’s expanding reach and how that reach is still developing new 
ways to pose security threats to the United States.  
In February of 2010, in response to Abdulmutallab’s failed attempt to detonate an 
explosive device on an airliner over U.S. soil, the House of Representatives Committee 
on Foreign Affairs met to discuss Yemen and its implications for U.S. Policy. In his 
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opening statement, Chairman Berman acknowledged the United States lack of being 
proactive towards addressing Yemen’s growing issues. “With so many pressing issues in 
the Middle East, the country of Yemen has received relatively little public attention since 
the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole, but all that has changed in the last 3 
months.”69 The focus of that particular hearing was to discuss challenges Yemen faced as 
determined by congress: the presence of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, religious and 
tribal conflict, separatist movements, dwindling natural resources and a failing economy. 
Outlined within the discussion was the Obama administration’s two pronged strategy, 
which was geared towards “bolstering and supporting Yemen on the security side, and 
promoting good governance and development on the socio-economic and governance 
side.”70 
In January of 2010, the U.S. Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations met to 
discuss ways in which the United States could confront Al Qaeda and State Failure in 
Yemen. In his opening remarks, presiding chairman John Kerry acknowledges that Al 
Qaeda is “deeply woven into Yemeni tribal society, having married into tribes and set up 
a network of schools and humanitarian aid in places forgotten by the central 
government,”71 suggesting ways in which Al Qaeda is seeking to win the hearts and 
minds of the Yemeni people in order to obtain more support for their cause. He continues 
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further in detailing his concern for prior U.S. policy efforts towards Yemen in stating, “I 
must say, the more I examine the issues of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and now Yemen 
and other places, the more I have to question whether or not America, and Americans, 
have made the judgments necessary, to make the commitments necessary in resources 
and effort and patience, in order to address these kinds of challenges.”72 
John Kerry’s opening speech then provided insight into the committees proposed 
methods of tackling the challenges Yemen presents. The first was to increase 
development and military aid in return for greater cooperation from then President Saleh. 
The second was to be wary of Anti-Americanism with careful attention being paid to the 
fact that narrowing a focus on Al Qaeda could limit the government of Yemen’s ability to 
partner with the United States. Third, he recommends that the U.S. become more realistic 
about Yemen’s current capacity to fight Al Qaeda, and commit to improve that capacity. 
Fourth, find ways for then President Saleh to address longstanding grievances in southern 
Yemen before unrest becomes an insurgency. His final suggestion is to view the threat 
posed by AQAP in the context of a global challenge.73 
 As evidenced by the discussions that were taking place in the U.S. legislative 
branch provided above, it is clear the Yemen is now again a focus of U.S. policy efforts. 
The question must be asked, though; Why has it taken so long for the U.S. to respond to 
Yemen’s poor performance and the implications it has on our domestic security? It 
wasn’t until late February of 2012, that the Obama administration announced its 
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partnership with the Yemeni government to in order to “combat the Qaeda franchise that 
has exploited the political turmoil there to seize control of large swaths of the country’s 
south.”74 While the Obama administration’s movement towards gaining ground on this 
issue is a step in the right direction, the United States’ delay in responding to Yemen’s 
woes is arguably a result of prior administrations making no real effort to engage this 
problem directly.  
 
Conclusions  
Defining what constitutes a failed or failing state and the criteria for which those 
definitions can be based upon is a very complex task that has yet to be solved by the 
international community. With each new model or theory that is presented, variations in 
terms and metrics are generated, which seems to further complicate the general 
understanding of what may previously be considered common knowledge. However, all 
models agree that the three most important facets to be measured are the legitimacy of a 
state’s government, the state’s economic progress, and the state’s success in promoting 
the welfare of its citizens.  
However unlikely it may be to occur, it would be beneficial to the international 
community if an overarching organization such as the United Nations would take the lead 
on establishing universally accepted criteria and definitions associated with measuring a 
state’s performance in order to allow all nations to assess internal performance and the 
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performance of other nations on an unbiased common ground. In doing so, intervention 
measures and associated performance thresholds may be defined, empowering the 
international community to collectively understand how it should respond to states that 
have failed or are trending in that direction.  
Given Yemen’s performance within the models provided earlier in this study, it 
can be concluded that Yemen has not reached failed state status, but is definitely trending 
in that direction as a failing state. This negative trending has been acknowledged as a 
major concern to the FFP, and should be regarded with the same level of concern from 
the rest of the international community. It would be interesting to uncover the amount of 
support Yemen has received from stronger nations in the Middle East region, as their 
fragile situation is undoubtedly affecting the regional security in a negative manner.  
Future research could be focused on what support measures have been 
implemented, along with the observed correlating impacts on Yemen’s performance. 
Diplomatic efforts geared towards encouraging Yemen’s neighbors to assist in 
strengthening their ability to resist terrorist infestation will not only benefit Yemen, but it 
will provide positive direction for the region as a whole, and ultimately the rest of the 
globe. Unfortunately, the Middle East region as a whole is performing poorly relative to 
much of the rest of the world, with many nations currently experiencing their own set of 
internal unrest and security dilemmas. Their ability to focus on and dedicate resources to 
other nations in the region is rather limited.  
There is certainly a nexus between transnational terrorism and failed or failing 




and Somalia, one can conclude that poorly performing states will enhance a terrorist 
organization’s ability to thrive. Further attention should be paid to Stewart Patrick’s 
argument that failing states are actually more advantageous for terrorist organizations to 
operate in, vice states that have totally failed, because government and logistical 
infrastructure facilitates an environment which is more conducive to planning and 
conducting terrorist activities.  
In light of Patrick’s argument, it would be beneficial to conduct research that is 
focused on determining if allowing states to fail actually prevents terrorist organizations 
from operating effectively out of them. Research could be focused on determining 
whether or not states that have failed, with very minimal or no prior terrorist activity 
within their borders, are currently experiencing a rise in terrorist related activity despite 
their failed status. In doing so, one may be able to provide an alternate method of 
discouraging terrorist organizations from gaining footholds in certain areas. Of course, 
should this theory gain traction, the world would be forced to address many other issues 
that come hand in hand with failed states which may or may not be worth the price one 
would willingly accept to prevent a state from harboring terrorist organizations.  
Yemen has been steadily developing a growing population of radical islamists 
within its borders since the early 1990’s. Instability provided within Yemen’s 
government will only prove to exacerbate that growth due to a growing dissatisfaction 
with living conditions amongst its citizens, and a history of corruption amongst high level 
officials, who may turn a blind eye to Al Qaeda activities within their borders, while at 




Financial aid helps, but only if the monetary resources which are given are 
managed with great oversight by the providing nation. Seeing as all three models 
provided have shown Yemen to possess a somewhat corrupt government which is 
incapable of adequately providing for its citizens, financial aid could be injected directly 
to the citizens by the providing nation, but with a focus or goal of attributing the credit to 
Yemen’s government. In doing so, supporting nations would be enabling the government 
to win the hearts and minds of its people, ultimately winning favor over terrorist 
organizations in the area that are attempting to accomplish the same feat. As a result, the 
government’s attempts to rid terrorist organizations from within its borders would garner 
much more favorable support from Yemen’s general population. 
While the U.S. seems to be focused on dedicating financial and military efforts to 
aid in Yemen’s challenges, policy efforts at this point may be considered to be too little 
too late. The U.S. has historically thrown money at Yemen’s woes and has not taken their 
issues seriously until recent years, where a series of eye-opening terrorist related 
incidents on U.S. soil with direct ties to Yemen were required in order to gain the full 
attention of our highest government officials.  
It looks as though the United States may be caught between a rock and a hard 
place. More involvement in the Middle East at this point is unlikely to gain much support 
from United States citizens, who are already exhausted with the extended status of 
military operations currently being conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan, with no clear 
picture of how the United States will eventually permanently withdraw from those 




involvement in the Middle East could further polarize radical organizations in Yemen to 
take an even more hostile stance against the United States, further increasing instability in 
Yemen, and at the same time, increasing the terrorist threat to the United States 
domestically. Finally, an increase in cooperation with the United States may prove to be 
less beneficial for Yemen, as they would be seen as internalizing Western ideals, yet 
again further polarizing much of the Middle East region against their efforts. 
On the other hand, simply ignoring Yemen’s troubles and watching the nation 
slowly but surely fail could potentially be even more costly to the United States. Seeing 
as the United States has been drawn into a war that will likely span at least two decades 
due to a terrorist organization’s insurgency in a failed Afghanistan, allowing Al Qaeda to 
continue increasing its presence could very well lead to a similar response in Yemen if 
left unattended. Allowing Yemen to fail could also exacerbate a myriad of already 
substantial humanitarian issues that the nation is currently facing such as poverty, human 
and drug trafficking, and governmental corruption.  
In a time of fiscal restraint, it would be interesting to see studies that are focused 
upon determining which option is more cost effective to the United States in the far term; 
supporting a failing state now, or a failed state later?  
The United States is preconditioned against the acceptance of failure, and given 
that Yemen is experiencing an increase in terrorist activity, it is highly unlikely that the 
United States will not become increasingly involved in assisting Yemen through financial 
and military means. The United States’ recent efforts to partner with the government of 




materialized long after Yemen began showing symptoms of state weakness and a terrorist 
insurgency, and is largely in response to recent domestic terrorist activity that is directly 
linked to Yemen.  
If the United States strives to enhance its policy of preemptively engaging 
terrorist organizations before they can become truly effective, it would be beneficial to 
place a more concerted effort on identifying failing states and scrutinizing symptoms of 
terrorism within their borders. Doing so will afford the United States an opportunity to 
take a more proactive approach to fighting the spread of terrorist influence, as opposed to 
reacting to the threat after it has allowed itself plenty of time to organize and gain an 

























Operational Capabilities of Terrorist Organizations Within Failed States 
 
 
The focus of this thesis chapter will revolve around failed state theory and the 
degree to which “failed” or “failing” states are perceived as attractive areas of operation 
for transnational terror groups. Conventional wisdom suggests that poorly performing 
nations provide themselves as attractive areas of operation for terrorist groups because 
they have limited ability to effectively monitor their borders, monitor the inflow or 
outflows of persons, money or resources, and possess very little ability to quell internal 
conflict.75 Following this train of thought, one might think that the more poorly a country 
is performing, the more attractive the state becomes as a terrorist foothold. 
However, some theorists, such as Stewart Patrick, would argue that “failing” 
states are actually more attractive to transnational terrorist groups than states that have 
totally “failed.” His argument is that terrorist organizations seek out “weak but 
functioning states, where formal state structures and trappings of sovereignty exist in a 
rudimentary form but are fragile and susceptible to corruption.”76 The idea here is that 
terrorist organizations need a basic and somewhat functioning societal infrastructure in 
order to be able to conduct operations effectively.  
An example of this basic infrastructure would be Al Qaeda’s online influence. In 
order to maintain this operational capability, Al Qaeda must operate in environments that 
possess electricity, computers, internet, etc. In other words, Al Qaeda would have a 
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harder time extending global influence if they decided to run operations out of the 
world’s most austere areas. 
If Stewart Patrick’s theory holds true and failing states are in fact more beneficial 
to terrorist organizations than states that have totally failed, would it not be more 
beneficial to accept or perhaps even facilitate state failure to the point where it no longer 
becomes beneficial to terrorist organizations?  
While this notion resonates with individuals who prefer a more isolationist 
approach to international relations and may lend itself effective in making a nation more 
difficult to conduct terrorist operations out of, it does not account for the fact that in 
addition to areas that terrorist organizations need to operate out of, terrorist organizations 
seek lawless areas to simply lay low in. Failed states are poised to provide just that. 
This paper will focus on Somalia as an unquestionably failed state (the most 
failed state according to many studies and indexes) in hopes of discovering if this status 
has hindered or helped the expansion of terrorist objectives within its borders. We will be 
analyzing the operational capabilities of al-Shabaab within Somalia, with an aim of 
correlating al-Shabaab’s organizational capabilities to the territory it operates out of, in 
order to answer the question as to whether or not extremely “failed” states strengthen or 
weaken the operational capabilities of terrorist organizations that choose to operate 
within them. 
My hypothesis heading into this paper is that extremely “failed” states weaken the 
operational capabilities of terrorist organizations that operate from within them due to the 




extremely failed state would impose limitations on a terrorist group’s organizational 




 As stated in the introduction, the aim of this paper is to determine whether or not 
Somalia’s status as an extremely failed state has imposed restrictions or limitations on al-
Shabaab’s ability to effectively operate as a terrorist organization. In order to succeed in 
doing this, there are many aspects of this discussion that must be addressed.  
 Because there is a lack of a formally agreed upon definition for what should or 
should not be considered a failed state, this paper will first focus on research performed 
by various scholars in an attempt to define the characteristics of a failed state for the 
purposes of this paper. A second question within the academic community that this paper 
seeks to address is how the international community should properly respond to failed 
states that harbor terrorist organizations. This paper will analyze differing viewpoints in 
an attempt to determine whether or not simply letting a nation completely fail is a valid 
alternative to nation building. 
We will then analyze Somalia through the Fund For Peace’s Failed State Index, 
which provides data that will clearly outline how Somalia performs as a nation-state 
relative to the rest of the world. As this paper will eventually demonstrate, Somalia is one 





After establishing Somalia as an unquestionably failed state through both 
literature reviews and quantitative data sets, we will analyze al-Shabaab’s operational 
capabilities as they are known to exist today. Where applicable, this paper will draw on 
comparisons to al-Qaeda, which is considered the world’s most prominent terrorist 
organization by many scholars, in order to draw conclusions as to whether or not al-
Shabaab demonstrates any lack of operational capability due to its decision to largely 
operate from within Somalia.  
This paper will conclude with an ultimate determination as to whether or not it is 
valid to assume that extremely failed states will hinder a terrorist organization’s 
operational capabilities. As a result of that determination, this paper will also seek to 
answer the secondary question of whether or not letting a state fail completely is a viable 
policy option when attempting to lessen a terrorist organization’s operational capability 
within that country. 
 
An International Focus on Failed States 
 The international focus on failed states as a security concern is relatively new, and 
was largely due to the attacks which occurred on September 11, 2001. Stewart Patrick, in 
“Failed” States and Global Security: Empirical Questions and Policy Dilemmas, recalls 
how officials in Washington and other capitals tended to regard peripheral states with 




changed dramatically after al-Qaeda’s attacks on the United States from Afghanistan, one 
of the poorest and most wretched countries in the world.”77 
 In the United States’ National Security Strategy of 2006, we find additional 
language that speaks clearly to the concern of failing states, as it reads:  
“Weak and impoverished states and ungoverned areas are not only a threat 
to their people and a burden on regional economies, but are also 
susceptible to exploitation by terrorists, tyrants, and international 
criminals” and that the United States “will work to bolster threatened 
states, provide relief in times of crisis, and build capacity in developing 
states to increase their progress.”78  
This concern over failed states is restated as one of the United States’ current 
priorities in the National Security Strategy of 2010, albeit in a less forceful manner, as it 
proclaims:  
“Failing states breed conflict and endanger regional and global security” 
and in response, “our diplomacy and development capabilities must help 
prevent conflict, spur economic growth, strengthen weak and failing 
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states, lift people out of poverty, combat climate change and epidemic 
disease, and strengthen institutions of democratic governance.”79 
 Language found in the National Security Strategies of 2006 and 2010 highlight 
the prominence of failed state discussions as they relate to American national security 
interests today. Because scholars present varying views on how we should approach 
failed or failing states in a globalizing world, we must provide careful attention to all 
available options in order to ensure American security objectives are met while being 
careful not to unintentionally strengthen a terrorist organization’s operational capability 
due to uninformed policy decisions. 
 
Is Failing an Option? 
According to Robert Rotberg, in Failed States in a World of Terror: 
failed states have come to be feared as ‘breeding grounds of instability, 
mass migration, and murder,’ as well as reservoirs and exporters of terror. 
The existence of these kinds of countries, and the instability that they 
harbor, not only threatens the lives and livelihoods of their own peoples 
but endangers world peace.80  
Furthermore, Rotberg highlights that Somalia and Afghanistan specifically: 
                                               
79 White House, “National Security Strategy,” (Washington, DC: White House, 2010), accessed July 15, 
2014.  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf 
80 Robert Rotberg, “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Cause and Indicators,” State Failure and 





are incapable of projecting power and asserting authority within their own 
borders, leaving their territories governmentally empty. This outcome is 
troubling to world order, especially to an international system that 
demands -- indeed, counts on -- a state's capacity to govern its space.81 
As a result, it is a common believe within the international community that such countries 
require international intervention in order to help rebuild their capacity to govern 
effectively and legitimately, provide for economic reforms, and enable those countries to 
provide for their own internal security in order to ensure terrorist groups cannot establish 
footholds and operate from within them.  Such intervention is commonly referred to as 
“state building” or “nation building.”  
Current United States National Security Advisor to the President, Susan Rice, in a 
policy brief written for Brookings Institute, points out that “such [failed or failing] states 
can and often do serve as safe havens and staging grounds for terrorist organizations. 
Failed states create environments that spur wider regional conflicts with significant 
economic and security costs to neighboring states.”82  
The spillover effects that failed states potentially play on a regional level is 
particularly relevant to security issues today, as we have recently observed a 
strengthening presence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a Syrian based 
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extremist group which gained control of Mosul, Iraq in June of 2014. 83 It might be of 
interest to note that Syria and Iraq were ranked the 15th and 13th most unstable nations in 
this year’s Fragile State Index.84 The growing influence of ISIS in Iraq is of great concern 
to other nations in the Middle East region, particularly Afghanistan and Yemen, as both 
of those nations are within relatively close proximity and possess very unstable 
environments. 
In response to the threat of terrorist networks finding footholds within failed 
nations, Susan Rice believes that an effective response is to “ combine improved 
intelligence collection with more aggressive efforts at conflict resolution and post-
conflict ‘nation-building’ in global crisis zones, [which would] create pockets of 
improved development and security [which] would help limit the operating space of 
international outlaws.”85 Rice continues by arguing that this can be accomplished by 
finding “innovative ways to assist failed and failing states through targeted development 
and counterterrorism assistance as well as improved trade access to the U.S. market.”86 
Robert Rotberg would agree with Rice’s sentiment, stating: 
the new imperative of state building should supersede any lingering 
unilateralism. State building trumps terror. If state building is done on the 
cheap, or if the big powers walk away from the failed states too soon and 
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decide that the long slog of reconstruction is for others, then the real war 
against terror will not have been won.87 
In sharp contrast to the nation building policies of Rotberg and Rice, some 
scholars believe that it would be better to simply let failing states fail. Jeffrey Herbst, in 
Let Them Fail: State Failure in Theory and Practice, points out that state failure is 
merely a normal part of a historical cycle of state creation and destruction. His arguments 
center around frustrations with the international community, which according to his 
viewpoint has “in the face of clear evidence of resumption of the cycle of state creation 
and destruction, seem[ed] determined to do no more than resurrect what has not worked, 
although the lesson of history is that political orders evolve by changing form and 
scale.”88 In other words, why continue to attempt to fix a system that has proven itself to 
be broken to begin with, rather than let a nation completely collapse and reform itself into 
one that will work? 
Herbst believes that the international community can facilitate a smooth cycle of 
state destruction and recreation by adhering to three simple principles. First, to accept 
that there are alternative forms of state structure that might work better for a nation at 
play in order to encourage the development of “alternatives, be they ideas for new states, 
formulations for new divisions within states, or innovative ideas on how subnational units 
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can relate to the capital.”89 Second, Herbst suggests that the international community 
begin practicing the decertification of old states which “are simply not exercising formal 
control over parts of their country and should no longer be considered sovereign” in order 
to provide “an avenue out of the current impasse, where there is no status to accord a 
country other than sovereignty, irrespective of domestic realities.”90 Finally, Herbst 
suggests that the international community learn to become more supportive towards the 
creation and recognition of new nation-states. He claims that “by recognizing and 
legitimating new groups, the international community has the opportunity to ask that they 
respect international norms regarding human rights and has a chance to bring them into 
the international community.”91 
Stewart Patrick is another scholar who feels that failed states should be less of a 
security concern to the international community than they are currently portrayed today. 
His basis for argument is that the threats failed states “pose are mainly to their own 
inhabitants. Sweeping claims to the contrary are not only inaccurate but distracting and 
unhelpful, providing little guidance to policymakers seeking to prioritize scarce attention 
and resources.92 The crux of Patrick’s argument is that failed states are not conducive to 
providing safety and security for terrorist organizations. Ironically, Patrick provides us 
with an account of how al-Qaeda discovered that Somalia was a less than favorable 
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environment to operate out of in the 1990s. He proclaims how it was discovered through 
“intercepted cables, [al-Qaeda] operatives bemoaned the insuperable difficulties of 
working under chaos, given their need for security and for access to the global financial 
and communications infrastructure.”93 He continues further by pointing out that “al-
Qaeda has generally found it easier to maneuver in corrupt but functional states, such as 
Kenya, where sovereignty provides some protection from outside interdiction.”94 
Contrary to the thoughts of most security officials, Patrick believes that “greater 
dangers emerge from stronger developing countries that may suffer from corruption and 
lack of government accountability but come nowhere near qualifying as failed states” and 
that by paying attention to those developing countries which lack accountability, we will 
be able to thwart transnational terrorist threats before they present themselves. 95 
The opposing viewpoints of Rotberg and Rice verses those of Herbst and Patrick 
are important in determining how we should address failing or failed states that are 
currently showing symptoms of transnational terror within their borders. With respect to 
the research purposes of this paper, if one were to determine that failed states do in fact 
hinder a terrorist organization’s operational capabilities, it might be advisable to simply 
allow those nations to continue to destroy themselves in hopes of discouraging future 
terrorist operations while allowing that nation to rebuild itself. On the other hand, if one 
were to determine that terrorist organizations are not operationally affected by the lawless 
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environments provided by failed states, one would assume it would be in the international 
community’s best interest to aid failed or failing states in the preventing terrorist 
organizations from operating within their borders. 
 
Somalia and the Failed States Index 
When seeking a more quantitative and non-biased approach to the measurement 
of state performance, a structured and comprehensive database is found in the Fund For 
Peace’s “Fragile States Index,” (formerly known as the “Failed States Index”), which 
focuses on 12 indicators of risk (grouped within social, economic, political and military 
categories) and grades countries against those indicators through the use of Conflict 
Assessment System Tool (CAST) which scans all available electronic sources to 
determine a nation’s ranking in each category.  
As published by the Fund For Peace: 
the strength of the Fragile States Index (FSI) is its ability to distill millions 
of pieces of information into a form that is relevant as well as easily 
digestible and informative. Daily, The Fund for Peace collects thousands 
of reports and information from around the world, detailing the existing 
social, economic and political pressures faced by each of the 178 countries 
that we analyze.96 
Additionally, the FSI is currently on its tenth reporting cycle since it was created in 2005, 
providing it with some informational legitimacy within the international community. 
                                               





The Fund For Peace’s Fragile States Index is not without its critics. Lionel 
Beehner and Joseph Young feel that the FSI is inadequate for numerous reasons. For one, 
they claim that the FSI is:  
an index that is supposed to provide an underlying value for state stability 
but instead, is lost in tautology. For example, many of the subcomponents 
measure violence. Since one of the supposed uses of the index is to 
forecast violence, measuring violence to predict violence is true by 
definition.97  
A second argument they present is that the FSI has failed to predict rather significant 
events, such as the Arab Spring.98 Beehner and Young don’t feel that that the FSI should 
be thrown out, but rather feel that analysts, particularly from a predictive analysis 
standpoint, could reform it for better use.  
As argued by Beehner and Young:  
we do not need an index to tell us that Greece is going through tough 
times or that Finland will not fail anytime soon. Nor do we need an index 
to remind us of Africa’s post-colonial problems with state building. The 
index should instead be constructed to give us greater analytical leverage 
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to anticipate events, whether they are acts of political violence, man made 
catastrophes, or regime changes.99  
While all of these are valid arguments, the FSI still stands as a valid resource for the 
purposes of this paper because the intent of this paper is not geared towards forecasting 
future events, but rather to analyze how terrorist organizations are affected by the 
stability of the state they currently, or historically, operated within.  
Somalia, the main country to be analyzed within this paper, has historically 
topped the FSI charts as one of the worst performing countries in the world, having been 
ranked the absolute worst performing country for six years before being displaced by 
South Sudan in the Fund For Peace’s 2014 FSI rankings with a final score of 112.6 out of 
a worst possible score of 120. As shown in figure 1, of the 12 categories scored, Somalia 
performs particularly poorly in the “Refugees” and “Factionalized Elites” indicators, 
scoring 10 out of a maximum 10 points in each category. However, this is somewhat of a 
moot point as Somalia averaged a score of 9.4 across all indicators, with its best score 
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Figure 1. Somalia’s Fund For Peace FSI Rankings 2014 
 
Source: The Fund For Peace 
 To place this information into context, the United States currently ranks 159th out 
of 178 countries with an overall score of 35.4 across all indicators. Finland ranks as the 
world’s most stable country with an overall score of 18.7. Somalia’s score places it in the 
bottom tier of FSI rankings, the “Very High Alert” tier, along with South Sudan, Central 
African Republic, Congo, and Sudan. A final country of note, and one to be analyzed a 
bit further in this chapter would be Afghanistan, which ranks 8th out of 178 countries in 
the FSI.101 As shown in figure 2, of the 12 indicators scored, Afghanistan performs 
particularly poorly in the “Security” and “External Intervention” indicators earning scores 
of 10 and 9.9 respectively. Surprisingly, despite the recent years of conflict within 
                                               





Afghanistan’s borders, one of Afghanistan’s best scores is found within the “Human 
Flight and Brain Drain” indicator, with a score of 8.7.102 
Figure 2. Afghanistan’s Fund For Peace FSI Rankings 2014 
 
Source:The Fund For Peace 
Somalia’s poor performance across all indicators measured by the Fragile State 
Index, will serve as this paper’s justification for labeling her as a “failed state.” Given her 
current ranking, along with previously serving as the world’s worst performing country 
for six consecutive years, it is difficult to argue that if only a few states in the world truly 




                                               





Al-Shabaab’s Operational Capabilities in Somalia 
 For the purposes of this paper, we will define operational capabilities as any 
means (regardless of whether or not that means is elementary or complex) through which 
a terrorist organization may recruit members, organize, communicate amongst members 
and the international community, travel, find safe haven, transfer supplies, plan terrorist 
events or other operations (such as participation in local government, providing local 
security services), and ultimately carry out successful terrorist attacks. This definition has 
purposely been drafted in a broad fashion in order to encompass the wide spectrum of 
functions one might consider operational when analyzing terrorist groups from various 
perspectives.  
 In order to place the operational capabilities of al-Shabaab into context, we must 
first consider the environment from which they largely operate within. A description of 
this environment is best put by Rotberg when he describes:  
Truly collapsed states, a rare and extreme version of a failed state, are 
typified by an absence of authority. Indeed, a collapsed state is a shell of a 
polity. Somalia is the model of a collapsed state: a geographical 
expression only, with borders but with no effective way to exert authority 
within those borders. Substate actors have taken over. The central 
government has been divided up, replaced by a functioning, unrecognized 
state called Somaliland in the north and a less well-defined, putative state 
called Punt in the northeast. In the rump of the old Somalia, a transitional 




far been unable to project its power even locally against the several 
warlords who control sections of Mogadishu and large swaths of the 
countryside. Private entrepreneurialism has displaced the central provision 
of political goods. Yet life somehow continues, even under conditions of 
unhealthy, dangerous chaos.103 
 Additionally, I’d like to propose three considerations we must acknowledge in 
order to effectively understand the manner in which al-Shabaab operates. First, we must 
consider that the operational aspects of an individual terrorist group are unique to that 
group. In other words, we cannot assume that all terrorist groups operate in the same 
manner given differences in ideology and preferred tactics. Second, we must 
acknowledge that the scope of a terrorist organization’s operations is relative to its 
organizational size, and operational objectives. Finally, we must acknowledge that 
terrorist groups are adaptive in nature and will learn to successfully conduct operations 
through the means available to them, which are largely dictated by the resources, 
manpower, and societal construct of the environment that they choose to operate from 
within. 
 As stated by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross in The Strategic Challenge of Somalia’s 
al-Shabaab, “al-Shabaab is a capable fighting force that implements a strict version of 
Shari'a in key areas of Somalia. Its range is enhanced by training camps from which 
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many Western Muslims have graduated.”104 From a manpower perspective, it is 
estimated that there are currently between 6,000 and 7,000 members within al-Shabaab’s 
militia, which possess a great deal of experience in “asymmetrical warfare, small unit 
tactics, and a wide array of weaponry.”105 Additionally, al-Shabaab is known to have 
carried out successful suicide bombings and the assassination of government officials. 106 
 Augmenting its regular militia, al-Shabaab possesses a core clandestine network 
within its organization, called the Amniyat. According to Ken Menkhaus in Al-Shabaab’s 
Capabilities Post-Westgate, Aminyat “operatives pose as secularized Somalis and assume 
roles across the full spectrum of Somali society, including positions in the Somali Federal 
Government and foreign missions.”107 Aminyat operatives are also known to be well 
versed in intelligence gathering operations, assassinations, explosives, and hit-and-run 
attacks.108  Taking the operational capabilities and tactics of both the Aminyat network 
and al-Shabaab’s regular militia into consideration, it is easy to see that al-Shabaab 
possesses a wide range of methods by which it can project its organizational objectives 
within Somalia. Additionally, these tactics are similar in operational scope as those that 
are carried out by al-Qaeda on a routine basis.   
 They key to any terrorist organization’s survival is its ability to actively recruit 
and maintain a loyal membership base. As evidenced by al-Shabaab’s surprisingly large 
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size, it can be concluded that it has no recruitment issues from a homegrown perspective. 
To put the organization’s core membership into perspective, some analysts put Al 
Qaeda’s “core membership at anywhere from 200 to 1,000” members, while Al Qaeda 
affiliated fighters are estimated to be made up of “thousands or tens of thousands.”109 
Considering Al Qaeda’s global prominence, al-Shabaab is a rather large organization 
given its rather concentrated geographical operating territory. 
 Currently, the greatest risk posed to the United States by al-Shabaab is its ability 
to recruit Somali men who reside in the United States to their cause. An “exodus of 
young Somali men from Minneapolis-St. Paul and elsewhere in the United States”110 
evidences al-Shabaab’s successful recruitment efforts where larger populations of Somali 
immigrants reside. al-Shabaab’s international recruitment does not stop with the US, as 
there are also “reports of young Somali men going missing from Canada, Europe, 
Australia, and Saudi Arabia.”111  
 According to a recent investigative report produced by U.S. House of 
Representatives’ Committee on Homeland Security, 40 or more American’s have already 
joined al-Shabaab, and of those 40 persons 15 have been killed while fighting for the 
organization, 4 have been prosecuted upon returning to the United States, and 21 or more 
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American’s remain unaccounted for overseas.112 The concern drawn from these 
successful recruitments is that those members could attempt to travel back into the United 
States and either spread al-Shabaab’s influence or even conduct future attacks within our 
borders.  
 Finally, we must consider al-Shabaab’s ideological ties to larger organizations 
such as al-Qaeda and it’s affiliate, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). According 
to the Committee on Homeland Security, al-Shabaab “has not only openly pledged 
loyalty and support to al-Qaeda and AQAP in Yemen, but has cemented alarming 
operational ties to both groups.”113 The ties being established al-Qaeda and AQAP are 
alarming because the relationships being built between these organizations are meant to 
enhance each organization’s operational capabilities respectively.  
While al-Qaeda may not have the organizational construct to operate effectively 
within Somalia and other parts of Africa, it can rely on its partnership with al-Shabaab to 
extend its ideological influence. al-Shabaab, on the other hand, can benefit from this 
relationship by gaining greater legitimacy in the eyes of its membership base and future 
recruits, while also adopting certain operational procedures and tactics that al-Qaeda has 
demonstrated as functional to a terrorist organization’s survivability.   
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From the viewpoints provided by the scholars above, we can certainly conclude 
that Somalia should be considered a “failed state” regardless of which definition anyone 
chooses to use. Somalia is the storied example of a state that has reached the lowest of 
lows and remained there for much of recent history.  
The Failed State Index provides us with an effective means of quantitatively 
measuring states along indicators in the economic, political, military and social welfare 
categories. Somalia’s position as the #2 worst performing country serves as more 
justification towards considering her as a failed state. 
The operational capabilities of al-Shabaab, while often overshadowed by those of 
al-Qaeda are significant, particularly within Somalia, and will not be going away anytime 
soon. As Gartenstein-Ross noted, it is far more likely that the clan-based extremism will 
survive longer than al-Shabaab as a group, so while the name may disappear, the violence 
will still exist.114  Furthermore, it is alarming to see al-Shabaab strengthening ties with al-
Qaeda. By analyzing al-Shabaab’s capabilities in Somalia, it may be wise to conclude 
that different organizations operate effectively under different conditions, and while al-
Qaeda may not be able to operate effectively within Somalia, they recognize that other 
groups such as al-Shabaab can, which is why a relationship is building between the two 
organizations. 
Given these observations, we can conclude that while al-Shabaab is less capable 
of operating as a terrorist organization than al-Qaeda on a global scale, they are still very 
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capable of conducting terrorist operations despite the environment they choose to operate 
within, and that the “failed state” environment has not limited their capability. A 
demonstration of this capability should be rather clear when one remembers al-Shabaab’s 
Nairobi mall attack, which lasted 80 hours and killed 67 people in September 2013.115  
Instead, Somalia’s environment has shaped the organizational goals and objectives of al-
Shabaab, and those organizational goals are what make it a lesser (but still very valid) 
international threat than al-Qaeda.  
Because we have demonstrated that failed states don’t hinder a terrorist 
organization’s operational capabilities, I propose that Patrick’s and Herbst’s “Let them 
fail” mentality, while very intriguing, is not as valid as Rotberg and Rice’s nation-
building approach. al-Shabaab is used to operating within a clan-based environment, 
where they can use their societal influence to pave the way for their organizational 
objectives. Merely leaving Somalia alone would only provide al-Shabaab the continuance 
of the status quo. And, since Somalia has already proven itself to be one of the most 
failed states in the world, it is tough to believe that the conditions in that country could 
deteriorate much further.  
In conclusion, this paper has proven my initial hypothesis to be false. Failed states 
do not hinder a terrorist organization’s ability to conduct operations, but instead, shapes 
the way in which terrorist organizations operate within them. Furthermore, the 
international community should continue nation-building efforts as opposed to letting a 
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nation fail. As evidenced by al-Shabaab in Somalia, an extremely failed state is capable 






































Confronting the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the Middle East 
 
Since the United States entered the Global War on Terror following the attacks 
that took place on September 11, 2001, we have taken on numerous terrorist 
organizations to include al-Qaeda in Iraq, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen. While we have no doubt seen successes in all of 
these fronts, terrorist networks are continually evolving into newer organizations with 
differing ideologies and ambitions, particularly as old leaders fall and new leaders rise to 
power. In more recent years, we have seen the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS), which would argue poses the greatest threat to the Middle East region to 
date. This chapter will serve as a study into how ISIS came to power, where they may go 
next, and how the United States might approach a war against this new and dangerous 
enemy. 
The focus of the third chapter of this portfolio will be to cover the following 
objectives. First, to answer the question as to whether or not the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria’s (ISIS) movements have taken advantage of weak states in the Middle East region 
due to their limited capacity to stop the spread of ISIS influence and subsequent territorial 
advancements. Second, using lessons learned from chapters one and two, attempt to 
predict which nations are at significant risk to the future expansion of ISIS due to their 
poorly performing statuses. And finally, to determine what strategic options and 




comprehensive strategy geared towards diminishing the presence of ISIS in the Middle 
East region.  
 
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 
 
 In order to understand how The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) rose to 
prominence, we must first cover a brief history of its roots in order to understand how the 
name came to existence, as there are many differing titles used by scholars, journalists, 
and politicians today, most of whom largely refer to the same group or variations of the 
group’s previous forms of existence.  
 While some argue that ISIS’s existence goes as far back as the early 1990’s, most 
consider the first formal step in its development was when Abu Masab al-Zarqawi 
established al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in April of 2004.116 Under Zarqawi, known as the 
“mastermind behind hundreds of bombings, kidnappings and beheadings in Iraq,”117 AQI 
was largely known for its sectarian war against Shia community within the country.  
Zarqawi’s rule over AQI lasted until June 7, 2006, when the United States Air Force 
dropped two 500-pound bombs on a house he inhabited, ending his life.  Zarqawi’s death 
represented the “most significant public triumph for the U.S.-led military coalition in Iraq 
since the 2003 capture of Saddam Hussein, although analysts warned that Zarqawi's death 
may not stem the tide of insurgency and violence any more than Hussein's capture 
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did.”118 Before his death, Zarqawi was successful in mimicking Osama bin Laden’s 
leadership strategy by developing “numerous semi-autonomous terrorist cells across Iraq, 
many of which could continue operating after his death.”119  
These terrorist cells would continue to grow under the inherited leadership of Abu 
Ayyub al-Masri, who would ultimately mastermind the creation of the Islamic State of 
Iraq (ISI) in April of 2007, naming Abu Omar al-Baghdadi as its leader. Masri’s purpose 
in creating ISI was an “attempt to put an Iraqi face on al Qaeda's foreign-led movement 
and unite the disparate Sunni Islamist and insurgent groups.”120 As one can assume, Abu 
Omar al-Baghdadi was a strong symbolic candidate for this position given the nature of 
his last name. Baghdadi and Masri would lead the Islamic State of Iraq until they were 
killed by U.S. and Iraqi security forces during a joint raid in the western province of 
Anbar in April of 2010. 121 
As a result of the deaths of Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi the 
leadership of ISI was inherited by its current leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, an al-Qaeda 
operative who was formerly held captive in a U.S. facility known as Camp Bucca in 
southern Iraq.122 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is responsible for merging the ISI with the al-
Nusra front in Syria, forming what today is known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
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(ISIS) or what some may also proclaim as the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” 
(ISIL), the “Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham,” or more simply put, the “Islamic State” 
(IS).123 Interestingly, Baghdadi has not sworn allegiance to al-Qaeda’s current leader, 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, and forged the alliance with the al-Nusra front against his wishes, 
leading many to “believe he now holds higher prestige among many Islamist militants”124 
than the chief of al-Qaeda himself. 
 For the purposes of this paper, we will refer to Baghdadi’s militants as ISIS to 
alleviate confusion to the reader. While some references used in this chapter may allude 
to ISIL or IS, it is assumed for the basis of this discussion that those politicians, scholars, 
and journalists are referring to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, as it stands under Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi’s leadership at this time.  
 In an effort to better predict the direction ISIS may be headed in the future, both 
geographically and ideologically, we must understand their motivations and capabilities 
as they stand today. Ideologically, ISIS is a Sunni-led radical jihadist group, which seeks 
to build a regional (and eventually global) caliphate of loyal Muslims who reject Shia 
Islam.125  As explained further by Dr. Akl Kairouz, a political science instructor at Notre 
Dame University when he states: 
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There is an important aspect of ISIS which we too often bypass as inherent 
to the group’s radical nature - its hatred of Shia Islam. This hatred is 
actually core to ISIS’ paradigm, its entire philosophy revolves around the 
idea that it is the true keeper of Islamic tradition and that the sword is the 
only mean to promote its faith.126  
Because of their deep-rooted hatred of Shia Islamists, we can observe ISIS’s movements 
within a Shia governed Iraq as a somewhat logical step towards their ultimate end state 
objectives. According to ABC News and Pew Research surveys, an estimated 45-55% of 
the Muslim population in Iraq identifies themselves as Shia.127  
ISIS’s sweeping territorial gains throughout Iraq in 2014 have been nothing short 
of astonishing. Utilizing an interactive article updated daily by the New York Times 
which draws from numerous credibly agencies for data, we can get a feel for the scope of 
ISIS’s recent territorial gains and their impact on Iraqi citizens. Between January and 
May of 2014, ISIS was known to have gained controlled much of the Anbar province 
western Iraq, displacing an estimated 500,000 Iraqis. This was followed up by a strong 
move to gain control over the areas of Mosul and Tikrit in the months of June and July, 
displacing another half-million Iraqis. More recently, ISIS has captured Sinjar, a Kurdish 
town in northern Iraq, which is largely populated by minority religious groups such as 
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Christians and the Yazidis.128 While these territorial gains represent the larger cities and 
provinces taken by ISIS, there are numerous towns and cities throughout Iraq that are 
currently under ISIS control that will remain unmentioned. 
 ISIS movements in Syria are driven by similar motivations. Although only 15-
20% of Syria’s population identifies themselves as Shia Islamists, ISIS’s main rub is with 
Bashar al-Assad’s regime, which is “dominated by Alawites (an offshoot of Shia 
Islam).”129 Ironically, it is believed by many that al-Assad initially welcomed the 
presence of ISIS fighters within Syrian borders during what is commonly referred to as 
the “Arab Spring” in March of 2011, in hopes that their presence would ultimately 
disrupt the organization of Syrian rebels which were seeking to overthrow his 
dictatorship.130 As a result, ISIS now controls large swaths of land in eastern Syria, the 
most notable cities being the cities of Aleppo, Hasaka, Raqqa, Dier al-Zour, and Abu 
Kamal.131  
Organizationally speaking, ISIS is far from being considered a small transnational 
terror group. It is estimated that ISIS is comprised of as many as 30,000 -50,000 
militants, and possesses a steady stream of volunteers eager to join its ranks from Syria, 
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Europe, and even the United States.132 The organization draws funding from “large 
extortion networks in Mosul that predate the US withdrawal” and by recently seizing the 
“financially valuable Conoco gas field, said to be worth hundreds of thousands of dollars 
a week, in Deir Ezzor, Syria.”133 In total, ISIS is estimated to be bringing in $3,000,000 
daily from its oil and gas resources from field it controls across northern Iraq and Syria 
and has an estimated $2,000,000,000 in cash and assets on hand.134 
As far as the manner in which they operate, ISIS is nothing short of barbaric. 
According to a United Nations report released in October, ISIS is responsible for an 
estimated 5,500 civilian deaths in Iraq alone since June of 2014. Continuing further, the 
report grimly highlights the “extremists’ campaign of physical and sexual violence 
against women and children, with accounts of women being captured and sold as sex 
slaves to Islamic State recruits, and children being used as soldiers.”135 The full brutality 
of ISIS didn’t become gruesomely apparent to the U.S. population until the beheadings of 
Americans James Foley and Steven Sotloff were posted to social media accounts in 
August and September of 2014, inciting a call to action from the American people and 
US Congress.  
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The bottom line is that ISIS is continuing to grow in influence, and has the 
motivation and capabilities (both militarily and financially) to extend its reach beyond its 
current position. As summarized best by Charles Lister, a fellow at the Brookings 
Institution in Doha, "ISIS now presents itself as an ideologically superior alternative to 
al-Qaida within the jihadi community and it has publicly challenged the legitimacy of al-
Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. " Furthermore, “it has increasingly become a 
transnational movement with immediate objectives far beyond Iraq and Syria."136 
 
 
ISIS Movements: Areas of Opportunity? 
 
 In the first chapter of this portfolio, we were able to draw a nexus between 
transnational terrorist organization movements and their proclivity to attempt to seize 
operational control of territories in failed or failing states, as exemplified by the relatively 
recent emergence of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen. Terrorist 
organizations gravitate towards these nations because poorly performing states have little 
to no border control, weak or corrupt governments which do not effectively govern the 
population, and the citizens of those populations are generally swayable due to the lack of 
social welfare they are being provided and the lack of economic opportunities available 
to them.  
 Because ISIS has outwardly expressed its desire to establish a regional, and 
ultimately a global caliphate, it would be wise for us to assume that their expansion will 
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not limit itself to territories within Iraq and Syria. A second assumption being made at 
this point in this chapter is that while ISIS wants to expand its reach globally, it will first 
seek to maximize its presence within the Middle East region. Therefor we should attempt 
to look at nations within close geographical proximity to current ISIS areas of influence, 
in an attempt to identify nations that are poorly performing and thus may be considered at 
particular risk to the manifestation of ISIS operatives within their borders.  
 For the initial analysis in determining which states pose as potentially attractive 
targets for future ISIS endeavors, we will again turn to the Fund For Peace’s Fragile State 
Index of 2014. We will utilize the Fund For Peace’s index because it serves as a non-
subjective set of quantitative measurements that provide a great basis for the analyzation 
of state stability across twelve primary social, economic and political indicators, which 
were highlighted in chapters one and two.137 The methodology behind this is to broadly 
identify the poorest performing states in the region, as analyzing every nation in the 
region would be beyond the practical scope of this paper. By identifying those states 
which stand out as significantly less stable than others in the region, we provide ourselves 
a starting point from which we can take a more in-depth look into each country and 





                                               





Figure 3: Fund For Peace Fragile States Index 2014. 
 
 
Source: The Fund For Peace 
 
 From figure 3, we can make a few observations. First, we can see that the Middle 
East region is performing relatively as a whole. While when compared to the North East 
portion of Africa and most of Asia the region looks relatively stable, it must be noted that 
all countries with the exception of Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, and 
Qatar (who are considered to be at a stable threshold) are labeled as “Warning” or “Alert” 
states according to the key provided. 
 Of the states showing a color that would indicate “Warning” or “Alert” 
performance grades, we find that Five nations stand out as extremely poor performers, 
warranting a color that indicates they are “Alert” states. Those nations include Syria, Iraq, 
Yemen, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Lebanon garner 
colors that indicate them being “Warning” states, but their stability figures are 




will take Yemen, Afghanistan, and Pakistan as states to scrutinize further in order to 
determine to what degree they are at risk of a possible ISIS presence in the relatively near 
future. We will exclude analysis on Syria and Iraq because ISIS is already actively 
conducting operations out of the two territories, and their desire to become increasingly 
more influential within those territories is evidenced by newsworthy advances by ISIS 
militants being made daily.  
 When looking at figure 3 a bit more closely, one might be inclined to ask why 
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran are not being considered for analysis, given their 
geographic proximity to Iraq and Syria. While their geographic proximity imposes 
inherent risks, all three of the nations have outwardly expressed dissatisfaction with ISIS 
in the region and are taking active steps towards reducing their influence. Because of this, 
we will exclude them from risk analysis, but will analyze their capacities to contribute to 
a comprehensive U.S. strategy against ISIS in a later portion of this chapter.  
 
Afghanistan 
 According to Fund For Peace data and trends analysis, Afghanistan ranks a 
miserable 6th out of 178 countries ranked. Moreover, Afghanistan has historically ranked 
among the world’s most poorly performing countries since the creation of the index 10 
years ago, where she held a marginally better 11th of 76 position on the global scale in 
2005.138 Fund For Peace analysis states that “corruption, drugs and extremism continue to 
                                               





run rampant across the country” and are a large factor in Afghanistan’s poor performance 
to date.139  
Afghanistan could serve as an attractive target to ISIS as it possesses a storied 
history of harboring terrorist networks, most notably the Taliban – a Pushtun Islamic 
fundamentalist group that reigned from 1996 to 2001, which is believed to have harbored 
Osama bin Laden during the United States’ Global War on Terror.140 While the Taliban 
has been largely on its heels since the U.S. counter-insurgency began in 2001, President 
Obama has recently reduced the United States’ military presence in Afghanistan to 
32,000 troops from a height of 101,000 troops in 2011. Furthermore, The President 
announced a plan in May of 2014 to continue reducing troops to a level of 9,800 by the 
end of 2014, and ultimately leaving behind only an embassy protection force by year 
2016.141 These announcements introduce the possibility of a security vacuum in 
Afghanistan post U.S. security force withdrawal, which could leave Afghanistan with a 
fate similar to what Iraq experienced when U.S. troops withdrew in December of 2011 as 
radicalist groups seek to re-establish themselves in the area.142 
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There are serious questions being raised as to the Afghani government’s ability to 
defend itself post troop withdrawals. As Max Boot, of the Council on Foreign Relations 
notes, as foreign military forces move out, “with them will go the bulk of foreign 
financing that has accounted for almost all of the state's budget.”143 In addition, 
Afghanistan has recently elected a new president, Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, which will 
present challenges in itself as the nation and its new appointed president adjust to a less 
seasoned government at the same time it experiences a massive withdraw of security 
forces.  Furthering this concern are reports that Afghani Taliban are considering an 
alliance with ISIS in order to produce a renewed insurgency. According to Rishi Iyengar 
of Time Magazine, Commander Mirwais, the leader of Hezb-e-Islami, has stated, “We 
pray for them (ISIS)” and “if we don’t see a problem in the way they operate, we will 
join them.”144 Hezb-e-Islami is an Afghanistan-based militant group with links to the 
Taliban, known for its higher levels of brutality. 
 Recognizing that Afghanistan possesses an even more fragile government and 
security force than Iraq did at the point of U.S. withdrawals, should leave no one with a 
comfortable feeling that they will be able to sufficiently defend themselves from ISIS 
movements should that organization seek to operate within their borders.  
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 Pakistan ranks 10th of 178 countries in this year’s fragile state index rankings. 145 
As outlined in Fund For Peace analysis, Pakistan’s deterioration in rankings is largely due 
to extreme grievances in the country with regards to her former Prime Minister, Raja 
Pervez Ashraf, who was arrested and charged with corruption in January for actions 
dating to 2010, while serving as Prime Minister. Additionally, low rankings were a result 
of, “a large number of bomb attacks over the year including the deadliest attack on 
Christians in Pakistan’s history. In September, more than 80 people were killed in a 
double suicide bombing set off at a church in Peshawar.”146 These attacks were claimed 
by the Taliban. 
 As if the existence of the Taliban in Pakistan wasn’t troubling enough, there are 
now reports that the Pakistani Taliban is vowing support of ISIS. In a statement released 
by Taliban spokesman Shahidullah Shahid, he proclaims, “All Muslims in the world have 
great expectations of you [ISIS] ... We are with you, we will provide you with 
Mujahideen (fighters) and with every possible support.”147 The Al Arabiya press release 
goes on to mention that ISIS activists have even been spotted in the city of Peshawar 
distributing informational pamphlets.148 The fact that the Taliban in Pakistan is making 
such proclamations serves to show that ISIS has already garnered favor among extremists 
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within the state and would suggest that a desire to carry out operations within Pakistan 
would be met with open arms.  
 The Pakistani government recognizes that they are at risk, recently releasing a 
secret memo, which captures some of the known intentions of ISIS within Pakistani 
borders. According to Mujeeb Ahmed of NBC, the memo details how “ISIS has created a 
10-man ‘strategic planning wing’ with a master plan on how to wage war against the 
Pakistani military, and is trying to join forces with local militants” with an intent to 
“inflict casualties to Pakistan Army outfits who are taking part in operation Zarb-e-
Azb."149 The apparent plan of ISIS is to leverage the existence of jihadist groups within 
Pakistan to wage war against a government which is already being worn thin by 
operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda linked terror groups.  
 
Yemen 
 According to Fund For Peace analysis, Yemen ranks 8th of 178 countries in the 
fragile states index for 2014.150 As outlined in chapter one of this portfolio, Yemen is 
currently struggling with the existence of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), 
and has seen continued U.S. led airstrikes within its borders against al-Qaeda since 2002. 
In total, an estimated 106 covert airstrikes have killed 525 militants over the past 12 
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years151, including Anwar al-Awlaki, a prominent al-Qaeda militant of American 
descent.152  
 As noted by Almosawa Shuaib, a journalist for the Daily Beast, “Al Qaeda 
exploits the continued separatist sentiment [within Yemen], which has been aggravated 
by the security crackdown and political marginalization.”153 Shuaib raises questions 
about the Yemeni government’s capacity to successfully defend against a long-term 
insurgency, stating that while U.S. aid to Yemen has “totaled over $600 million” the 
“government’s commitment to fight the militants is questionable.”154 He continues 
further to note that the Yemeni “government’s failure to address longstanding issues, has 
brought the Islamist-led government and the Hadi presidency to the brink of collapse.”155 
 While Yemen struggles to identify a sound form of self-government, ISIS is 
garnering support from AQAP. As pulled from a recent AQAP statement provided by the 
Yemen Times, AQAP “announce[s] solidarity with our Muslim brothers in Iraq against 
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the crusade. Their blood and injuries are ours and we will surely support them.”156 The 
statement released by AQAP goes so far as to even provide ISIS advice, stating: 
 Be cautious about dealing with cell phones and internet networks; do not 
gather in large numbers or move in large convoys; spread in farms or hide 
under trees in the case of loud humming of warplanes; and dig 
sophisticated trenches because they reduce the impact of shelling.157 
 All three of the countries outlined above have three things in common. First, they 
are all suffering from governments that possess a real lack of control over their 
populations, along with no solid ability to provide proper security against outside threats. 
Second, comparatively speaking, all three rank among the world’s most unstable nations 
according to the Fund For Peace’s fragile state index. Finally, Afghanistan, Pakistan and 
Yemen are all currently struggling with the existence of extremist groups aimed at 
overthrowing the government, all of which have recently pledged allegiance to ISIS. 
Because of these observations, it can be justified that all three nations are at a relatively 




U.S. Approach and Potential Partners 
 
 The United States’ current military approach to the destruction of ISIS is 
highlighted by continued airstrikes (along with the support of coalition air forces) within 
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Syria and Iraq on known ISIS militant locations and operational infrastructure to include 
vehicles, ammunition stockpiles, and command and control structures. The overarching 
result of these efforts is to remain unseen at this point, however, there are indications that 
the leader of ISIS, Bakr al-Baghdadi was among those wounded, if not killed, in the 
airstrikes of al-Qaim on November 8, 2014.158 This is a great advancement for coalition 
forces, however, we’ve seen through the historical analysis of AQAP and ISIS, this does 
not mean the terrorist group will be deterred from continuing their cause. Because the 
United States government has expressed a non-negotiable desire to remove troops from 
the theatre by 2016, they may be placed in a position where they have no choice but to 
continue air strikes until the threat ISIS poses is deemed at a level which no longer alarms 
the international community. 
 Many believe that the withdrawal of troops from Iraq created a security vacuum 
which provided ISIS the opportunity to sweep through the nation relatively unchallenged. 
Taking this into consideration, the U.S. should revisit its plan to completely remove 
troops from Afghanistan by 2016. Should they continue plans to do so, it is highly likely 
that ISIS, along with their newfound partners in the Afghani Taliban, will seek to take 
advantage of a security vacuum similar to that which was found in Iraq. An alternative to 
this approach would be to leave the current troop levels as they are today, so as to 
maintain the status quo, at the very minimum. Doing so would allow the United States 
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more time to accurately assess ISIS’ intentions and Afghanistan’s capacity to defend 
itself against that threat, should ISIS move in Afghanistan’s direction.  
 Aside from continued airstrikes, the U.S. has an opportunity to utilize other 
nations in the region to assist in their cause. While not a typical partner of the U.S., Iran 
has expressed an intense interest in aiding of the dismantling of ISIS. Because Iran is a 
majority Shia country, her government feels extremely threatened by ISIS advancements, 
and given current discussions with the U.S. over the future of Iran’s nuclear program, 
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has indicated that he’d be willing to aid in the 
destruction of ISIS if the U.S. will show some concessions during nuclear discussions. In 
a recent before the United Nations General Council, Rouhani stated, “We are determined 
to continue our confidence-building approach and our transparency in the nuclear 
negotiations” and “If our interlocutors are equally motivated and flexible,” Iran and the 
U.S. could tackle “very important regional issues, such as combating violence and 
extremism.”159  
While the thought of cooperating with Iran brings shudders to much of the 
international community, the United States might not have a more capable partner in the 
region, particularly one with a real motivation to ensure ISIS’ Sunni-led “caliphate” does 
not come to fruition. Not only does Iran possess a cause, but she possesses a military 
capable of carrying out her wishes. Her military is comprised of an estimated 545,000 
active frontline personnel with another 1,800,000 personnel in active reserve status. She 
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has an estimated 2,400 tanks, 480 aircraft, and 395 naval vessels that are operational and 
ready for tasking.160 By ignoring her ability to provide a valid military presence in the 
region the United States would be shunning a considerable amount of manpower and 
firepower that could be thrown at ISIS.  
A second potential partner can be found in the state of Turkey. Until recently, 
“Turkey has refused to allow its Kurdish fighters to cross into Syria because of links 
between Syrian Kurds and Turkey’s own separatist rebels” however, she “has come 
under pressure to increase its support for the international coalition fighting ISIS,”161 
which is a significant step in the right direction.  
While the U.S. and Turkey are natural allies by nature of their co-existence in 
NATO, the United States would surely benefit from an increased level of involvement 
from a nation that boast one of Europe’s largest armies. Additionally, Turkey is of 
strategic importance geographically, as she borders Syria to the North and can serve as a 
geographic buffer that contains ISIS militants within regions to the South. As far as 
military capabilities are concerned, Turkey is a very capable partner. She boasts of an 
estimated 410,000 active military personnel, 3,650 tanks, 980 aircraft, and 115 naval 
vessels.162      
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A final partner to consider would be that of Saudi Arabia. While a Sunni nation as 
a whole, Saudi Arabia does not agree with the extreme brutality that ISIS has shown, and 
because of this, is currently aiding in coalition airstrikes. Saudi Prince al-Faisal’s 
reasoning for joining coalition forces was best shown when he said, “we don’t consider 
ISIS as being a Muslim group, because of what they do to Islam.”163 He continues 
further, explaining that, “you don’t simply create an Islamic state by chopping people’s 
heads off and enforcing your opinion on them.”164 Saudi Arabia’s military might is 
comprised of an estimated 233,000 active duty personnel, 1,000 tanks, 650 aircraft, and 
50 naval vessels.165  
As the United States seeks to build a comprehensive strategy geared towards 
addressing the growing power and influence of ISIS in the Middle East region, we must 
look at strategic nations in the region that could serve as much needed allies as against 
this threat. Additionally, we should look at our own internal strategies and question 
whether not they suitably address ISIS’s long-term ambitions within the Region. We 
must be careful to not only look at where ISIS operates now, but also to make realistic 
assumptions about territories they will likely operate from in the future, and plan 
accordingly.  
By recognizing that there is value added in increasing our relationships with 
Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, the United States can bring a considerable amount of 
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military fight to ISIS without increasing the United States’ own military footprint. 
Furthermore, by engaging these three nations directly, the United States can ensure that 
there are geographical allies that are physically between ISIS’ current locations, and 





 As evidenced by the research presented above, one can see that ISIS has taken 
advantage of the security vacuum in Iraq created by U.S. troop withdrawals, and political 
instability in Syria over the existence of Bashir al-Assad’s regime, in order to advance 
their brutal objectives. ISIS has garnered the attention and admiration of extremist 
organizations throughout the Middle East, and their rise to prominence has placed them 
in a position where they can argue themselves as a more relevant transnational terrorist 
organization than al-Qaeda. As noted earlier in this chapter, ISIS is interested in creating 
a Sunni-led Islamist Caliphate that would blanket the entire Middle East region, and 
eventually the world. Taking this motivation into consideration, we must look beyond 
Iraq and Syria and identify nations that would be likely targets of opportunity for ISIS to 
conduct operations out of in the future.  
 Through the analysis presented by the Fund For Peace, one is able to draft 
predictions as to where ISIS may move next. In my analysis, I identified Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and Yemen as states that at considerable risk of allowing ISIS to gain footholds 




new presidency, an ongoing battle with Taliban insurgents, and serious questions 
surrounding her ability to provide internal security once U.S. troops withdraw fully by 
the end of 2016. Pakistan is facing similar turmoil, struggling with a government wrought 
with corruption while battling Pakistani Taliban militants that are eager to join ISIS 
forces. Yemen has already proven herself incapable of ridding AQAP from within her 
borders despite ongoing U.S. financial aid and airstrikes. AQAP has become emboldened 
with ISIS’ recent successes and allowing the two organizations to strengthen ties will 
only bring more instability to Yemen. 
 When analyzing the United States’ strategy towards the engagement of ISIS, one 
realizes that continued airstrikes are perhaps her only option from militaristic standpoint, 
unless the current administration changes direction and decides to maintain our current 
ground footprint or even expand it. Given our intent to minimize our ground footprint, the 
U.S. must look at other nations in the region that are capable of filling that capability gap. 
In doing so, we identify Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia as nations of strategic interest 
which have all expressed a willingness to take the fight to ISIS.  
Despite possessing different motivations for wanting to aid in coalition efforts, all 
three nations are geographically significant because they contain ISIS movements in 
certain ways. Turkey contains ISIS from spreading its influence to the North, Saudi 
Arabia acts as a geographical barrier between ISIS in Syria and AQAP in Yemen, and 
Iran acts a geographical barrier between ISIS in Iraq and the Taliban militants in 




possess the three largest militaries in the immediate region surrounding ISIS’ current 
operating grounds. 
In conclusion, if the United States wants to eliminate ISIS from the Middle East, 
it must become more proactive by predicting where ISIS is turning to next, and thwarting 
symptoms of extremism before they become unmanageable. A great starting point is 
found through the identification of the most failed states in the region, and determining 
whether or not there are significant enough motivations for ISIS to gravitate towards 
them. Additionally, the United States will need to seek partners in the region that are 
willing to support with military might in absence of U.S. troops on the ground. While the 
partners identified above may not be ones the U.S. generally works with, it is imperative 

























In chapter one of this portfolio, I established that there is much work to be 
accomplished with regards to developing standard terminologies when discussing failed 
or failing states. Possessing a myriad of terms that refer to a generally similar condition 
of state performance only creates confusion. Likewise, it would be beneficial for 
scholars, and the international community as a whole, to come to a consensus on criteria 
for which we can measure state performance. Doing so will allow the international 
community to determine thresholds by which certain terms can be used to label certain 
levels of state performance. Additionally, by standardizing thresholds through which 
states can be measured as failed or failing, we can then develop a framework for standard 
responses by the international community, or at the very least, develop a means to bring 
attention to that state and begin a dialogue regarding how that state is impacting its 
neighbors and the international community as a whole, particularly with respect to 
security issues.  
I also establish that there is in fact a nexus between transnational terrorist 
organizations and failed or failing states. I demonstrate this through the existence of al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) growing influence within Yemen. I highlight 
how the symptoms of their presence in Yemen were there long before the United States 
took action to attempt to rid Yemen of AQAP’s presence. As a result of this failure to act 
in a proactive manner, I find that the United States has now been placed in a position 




and with a Yemeni government that is half-heartedly attempting to address this issue 
internally, the United States will be supporting in this fashion for the foreseeable future.  
In chapter two, I test Stewart Patrick’s argument that failed states may actually be 
less attractive to transnational terrorist organizations than states that are considered to be 
failing. I do this by performing a case study on al-Shabaab in Somalia. The aim of this 
study is to determine to what extent a truly failed state hinders or helps a terrorist 
organization’s operational capability. Through research, I find that there is no real 
capability loss experienced by al-Shabaab’s existence in Somalia. While their ambitions 
are different, per say, than those of al-Qaeda or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, their 
actual operational capabilities are not hindered.  
While we note that transnational terrorist organizations have admitted it being 
difficult to conduct operations out of Somalia due to its chaotic state, I observe that this 
does not prevent terrorist organizations from growing within that nation. Al-Shabaab 
serves as an example of a terrorist organization that has adapted to its environment in a 
manner which allows it to conduct operations effectively from within an extremely failed 
state. Lessons learned from these observations are particularly pertinent to policy makers 
within the international community as they seek options on how to deal with terrorist 
organizations that reside in states that are trending in a negative manner. While tempting 
from a fiscal responsibility standpoint, allowing a state to collapse further does not prove 
to prevent terrorist organizations from operating within its borders.   
In chapter three, I build upon research conducted in chapters one and two, and 




transnational terror organization insurgencies due to their status as a failing or failed 
state. Using the Fund For Peace’s CAST model for metrics and corresponding analysis, I 
was able to identify Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen as states that are performing 
significantly more poorly than other nations in the region, and subsequently are at 
significant risk to the future ambitions of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) as it 
seeks to build a regional, and eventually a global “Islamic Caliphate.” After those states 
were identified, I conducted research further to analyze their capacity to defend against 
ISIS intentions, highlighting that all three are ill-equipped to do so, and all three have 
extremist groups within them that openly support ISIS objectives.  
After establishing that Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen are at risk to the future 
ambitions of ISIS, we take a broad look at the Middle East region to find particular 
nations that are placed in a good position to assist the United States in developing a 
comprehensive strategy geared towards the destruction of ISIS as a transnational terrorist 
organization. Through this analysis, I identify Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia as nations 
with particular stake in the destruction of ISIS, along with a considerable amount of 
firepower that could be used to offset the planned removal of U.S. troops in theater 
beyond 2016. Additionally, all three countries are strategic from a geographic 
perspective, as Turkey contains ISIS to the North, Saudi Arabia presents a geographic 
barrier between ISIS operatives in Syria and AQAP operatives in Yemen, while Iran 
provides a geographic barrier between ISIS operatives in Iraq and the Taliban militants in 




Ultimately, this thesis portfolio accomplishes three main objectives. First, it 
acknowledges that failed or failing states pose as attractive environments to transnational 
terrorist organizations, and while poor state performance does not guarantee the presence 
of terrorist networks, it does enhance the probability of their existence, particularly if 
terrorist groups are already operating within other areas in the region. Second, through 
the analysis of al-Shabaab in Somalia, this research proves that allowing a state to 
completely fail is not a valid approach to deterring terrorist networks from operating 
within that state. Finally, this portfolio provides framework for the future prediction of 
states which may become vulnerable to transnational terrorist movements due to 
declinations in state performance.  
This research is significant in that it brings forth a more forward leaning approach 
to current academic discussions surrounding failed states and the security impacts they 
present to neighboring nations and the international community as a whole. Much of the 
conversation today revolves around how poorly performing states are currently struggling 
to address extremist groups within their borders. This portfolio separates itself from those 
discussions by looking towards nations that are performing poorly, and predicting their 
susceptibility to future transnational terror organization movements. 
If we as an international community can begin to predict where terrorist 
organizations are seeking their next operating base, we can work with those nations at 
risk to ensure this does not happen. By supporting at risk nations on the front end, we can 




prevent transnational terrorist groups from establishing firm roots in their desired areas of 
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